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Introduction 
 
In todayÕs globalized economy, companies are now not only competing and keep up 
with local competitors but foreign competitors too. This continuous international 
competition in business force companies to improve and change their companyÕs 
structure in order to survive and thrive. Companies have in many years tried to find 
ways to compete effectively with corporations worldwide and their desperate search 
for external and internal growth seek them to the lately merge and acquisition (M&A) 
activities which now are increasingly used worldwide. Since early 1900s, there have 
been some abnormal waves of mergers and acquisitionsÕ especially between 
American industries (Mantravadi and Reddy, 2008a). According to the 2007 research 
report by Boston consulting group, USA have completed over deals 4,000 between 
1992 and 2006 (Mantravadi and Reddy, 2008a). These report figures suggest that 
merges and acquisitions might occur as a reaction to the period change in economy 
and industry such as changes in industry structure correlated to periods of restructure, 
changes in industries technological advances or deregulation (Jensen, 1993; Mitchelle 
and Mulherin, 1996). Despite JensenÕs suggestion, many authors have difficulties 
explaining the reason why mergers have historically only occurred in industry-specify 
waves. No matter the reason from occurring waves, the increase in the M&A activity 
show the drive and need for market share and demand for joining together different 
components of their value chain to create competitive advantages. Merges and 
acquisitions have become one of the greatest real methods of corporate restructuring 
and becoming a crucial part of the longstanding business strategy for corporations in 
USA.  
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Economic theory has offered many potential reasons for why mergers might occur; 
such as economies of scale or other ÒsynergiesÓ that can be established by joining 
entities together such as reduction of excess costs, and established opportunities for 
diversification. There have been other theories suggesting the possibility of market 
power by forming an alliance to compete with bigger competitors (Achampong and 
Zemedkun, 1995). Furthermore, the importance of a faster growth and new 
investment opportunities to move into a newer market or acquisition of new 
technology and competence without building it from scratch are all reasons for M&A 
activities.     
 
One of the most important reason for M&A activity is the theory of created value 
which does not only happens for managers but also for the shareholders. Most 
research on the financial performance of mergers and acquisition has focused on stock 
returns reaction close to specific public announcement dates to investigate the stock 
performance of M&A companies. In theory, M&A activities help business maximize 
shareholders wealth. Due to this view many shareholders would not be opposed by 
the idea of mergers or acquisition activities in the firms. However, many studies have 
been studying whether this positive abnormal return might be a short-term gain due to 
the extremely overexcitements of the announcement which declines after the 
announcement of the M&A activity, or a positive share return performance that holds 
on in the long term. The empirical studies are numerous and the results have been 
mixed. Some studies suggest no significant abnormal return while others suggest a 
more negative abnormal return, which makes the whole shareholders maximizing 
value left unanswered. The central question is whether shareholders are better off 
without M&A activities. 
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All these potentials methods for bettering firmsÕ financial performances are often the 
reasons given by practitioners to justify M&A activities. Despite all the positive 
outcome from deal activities, majority of studies have established that these potential 
efficiency gains and value creation resulting from M&A rarely materialize after the 
deals. Consequently, many studies might not support the theory of merges and 
acquisition, which make one to believe that these theories might not work in reality 
(Hariharan, 2005; Mallikarjunappa and Nayak, 2007; Tambi, 2005). Nevertheless, no 
matter how M&A companies are responding to deals, one can argue that these 
activities signify a new creative strategy to increase performances but could likewise 
according to Ransariya (2010) be seen as damaging the economy. Regardless of what 
one thinks of M&A activities, M&A activities do represent a major trend in the global 
economy. Arguably, this is an area of potential good as well as potential harm in 
global economy. Therefore, an analysis has to be made regarding the financial 
performance of merger or acquiring firms to gain some insights into the performances 
of acquiring firms (ibid). 
 
This research study is aimed at studying the impact of mergers and acquisitionsÕ 
financial performance in different American industries over the period of 1998 to 
2011. By examining the short-term stock performances and the long term accounting 
performance of public listed and traded companies in US, one can examine the 
financial performance changes associated with the merge activities in both long and 
short term. Also, one can argue that post-merged performances might be different 
depending on the size of the bidder and method of payment. This clearly shows the 
importance of understanding what factors that determine a positive post acquisition 
performance.  All this might lead to a better understanding of performances of merges 
and acquiring firms. 
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The particular questions that are going to be answered by the study are: 
 
¥ Does the accounting performance of companies improve after mergers and 
acquisitions activities? 
¥ Does the performance of companiesÕ shareholders stock value improve in 
short-term after mergers and acquisitions activities? 
¥ Do factors such as firmsÕ size and the type of payment to the target influence 
the stock performance of the bidder? 
¥ Does acquiring firms, in conclusion perform better after deal activities? 
 
The next section will feature the discussion of relevant literature review as well as 
some discussion of the conceptual issues on pervious empirical investigations and 
theories about the topic, likewise the merger and acquisition activities in America 
throughout those years. Section three deals with the description of data collection, 
data set used and other methodology such as the description of different used test and 
definition of variables. In section four the presentation of the result and findings will 
be outlined. Finally, section five offers some conclusion while section six shows some 
limitations and recommendation for further work on the subject.  
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2 Literature review 
2.1 The motives and reason for why firms involve in M&A activities. 
 
In the academic literatures there have been many theories and debates about the 
motives and reasons for why firms involve in M&A activities. All authors concur that 
M&A is driven by many complex reasons, which can vary with different deal and 
cannot be fully justified by any single theory or approach. An understanding of the 
true motives why companies merge and acquirers must be taken a closer look at in 
order to understand the mind of managers. Despite the many conflicting theories, 
there are a few main drives for M&A activities. The following section provides the 
understanding of different reasons and theories behind M&A activities. 
2.1.1. Growth, expansion and increase in market share 
 
The view that two is bigger than one does apply when one considers deals. By 
combining two companies together one creates a bigger company, which in that case, 
increases the companyÕs market share. Likewise, an increase in market share, gives 
the opportunity to control price settings in a monopolistic way. Similarly, an increase 
in market share also leads to a decline in competitors in the market. However, this 
tactic is rather criticised for its demolition of customer welfare. Based on the theory of 
economic competition, fewer players in the market reduce the competitive forces and 
increase opportunity to control prices. Horizontal merger is an example of a way to 
reduce possible market competitions (Eckbo,1983). It is also showed through the 
theory of collusion that the collusive of companies might lead to higher prices for the 
customers and average gain for the acquiring firms. The theory state that it is not only 
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acquirer firms that benefits from the acquisition and the reduction of number of 
players in the market, all competitors would expect to gain from it. In the theory of 
collusion, both the acquirer and competitors will benefit from the acquisition (ibid). 
The first discovery of collusive theory was tested by Eckbo (1983) who found that 
even competitors earn significant abnormal return around the announcement date. 
However, the test was rejected due to insignificant negative abnormal results. 
 
The main objective of companies is to expand and broaden their product lines or 
move into an existing market. According to literatures, it gives the possibility to grow 
and expend easier, which would likely not be achieved if they did not go through 
M&A strategy (Eckbo, 1983; Brealey and Myers, 2004). For example, by acquiring a 
small company, which specializes in products in a market the bidder company wants 
to expand into, gives the bidder company the opportunity of using tool, skills and 
other competitive advantage obtained from the target company. This consequently 
limits the acquired companyÕs need to construct the product line from scratch. In 
other words, M&A activities enable a company to acquire a growing business without 
building up a new one (Gaughan, 2002). Therefore, growth is created when merged 
companies can capture the opportunity available in the market more quickly than they 
would have done if they were not merged (ibid). This so called strategic theory can 
increase value and therefore overlaps to the extent with the efficiency theory (ibid). 
2.1.2. Economies of scale 
 
The theory of economies of scale state that larger companies have the advantage of 
increase in efficiency of production as the number of goods produced increases (The 
economist, 2008). Typically, a company that achieves economies of scale lowers the 
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average cost per unit by increased production since fixed costs can be minimized by 
increased number of goods. This minimization of cost can be obtained due to 
companies being merged.  By merging the two companies into one, the merged 
company would now be able to share technology, administration costs, management 
cost and even employees. Price reductions are made possible as a result of the cost 
reductions, which increases market-share and market-power. Economies of scale 
enable companies to offer more products and services. Because low costs is important 
for companyÕs profitability, success and survival, achieving these economies of scale 
is a natural motivation for merge activities (ibid).   
2.1.3 Improved management 
 
A common reason for companiesÕ failure is weak management. Therefore, by 
merging with larger companies with possibly higher level of management experience, 
gives target companies the chance to create better management. It is often seen that it 
takes a greater degree of managerial skill in order to control a larger organization than 
a small business. It is no denial to state that, a company with weak managerial skills 
acquired by a company with stronger managerial skills can possibly improve 
efficiency. For instance, once the two companies combine, the inefficient 
management can be replaced with an enhanced one, which again improves efficiency. 
Hence, M&A activities are a simple way to eliminate inefficiency since shareholders 
do not have direct access and power to control managers as well as managers never 
would demote themselves (Brealey and Myers, 2004). 
 
 
  11 
2.1.4 Diversification  
 
Diversification is said to be one of the major reason for M&A activities. When 
companies decide to use their excess cash to grow by re-investing it rather than 
distributing it to their shareholders, they can invest in business opportunities they 
think would best benefits the firm. By investing in business opportunities without 
putting themselves in much earning volatility is called diversification, in other words 
not using their own money. This can be achieved, for instance, by expanding into 
different types of industries and markets to diversity their risk while at the same time 
getting the opportunity to achieve steadily profits. Nevertheless, there are some 
negative arguments directed against diversification. For example, Brealey and Myers 
(2004), argue that investors do not pay excess premium for diversified firms because 
they can diversify their risks more efficient and cheaper by putting their shares into 
portfolios.  
2.1.5. Synergy and Efficiency theories 
 
According to the theory, synergy is created when the combined value of two 
companies involved in M&A activity is more than the value of two separate firms. In 
other words, synergy is a situation where 1+1 becomes 3 instead of 2 (Sudarsanamet, 
1996). Synergy enhances cost efficiencies and takes the form of economies of scale in 
operating synergy and cost reduction in finance synergy  (Gaughan, 2002). Also an 
larger M&A firm may have improved access to capital market, which later leads to a 
decrease cost of capital which is again a financial synergy. Likewise, there are other 
synergies such as revenue sharing synergy, which is created when the combined 
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companies generate combined revenue. So an increase in revenue after merge or 
acquisition will possibly be the outcome of synergy (Gaughan, 2002).  
 
Furthermore, when a company with better financial position but with less profitable 
investment opportunities merge or acquires by a company with higher growth 
opportunity but less well financial position or insufficient access to capital, financial 
synergy is created. This is often the result when larger firms merge with or acquires 
smaller firms.  There are other synergies such as tax, depreciation and diversification 
benefits. Despite the advantages of synergy, there have been many researchers 
criticizing the idea of synergies over the years. Trautwein (1990) stated that, financial 
synergy cannot be accomplished in an efficient capital market as if it was possible, 
every company would be performing M&A activities. While Rumlet (1982) claims 
that there is no evidence that synergy lowers systematic risk and Kitching (1967) 
suggests that operating and managerial synergies just seem to be an imprecise reason 
for M&A activity.  
2.1.6. Value creation 
 
If M&A acquisition increases value, this value would be reflected in firmsÕ respective 
stock prices. In general, a positive abnormal return associated with M&A news leads 
to an increased value. Many managers and business owners do believe that stock 
prices of companies that have been involved in mergers or acquisition activities do 
actually generate positive abnormal return over a specific period (Chan et al., 1997).  
Therefore, a negative abnormal return often indicates many different reasons of what 
went wrong. Reasons such as unsuccessful deals of a more or less underperformed 
target firm could consequently lead to no opportunities for improvements and value 
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creation. Likewise, if the market does not consider the deal to be as good of a strategy 
as the managers think, could also be the reason why acquiring firms generates low 
stock prices (Ederington & Guan, 2005) 
In order to understand the way the value could be created, one needs to understand the 
behaviour in the market, i.e. the question whether the market is efficient or not. The 
early discussion of market efficiency came from Fama (1970). The author argues that 
markets are efficient and that the market is the place to go if one wants to estimate 
prices. However, if the market is inefficient, there will be a misprice in the market 
price. This mispricing can result to some shareholder being able to make higher 
returns than others due to the capacity to estimate how the market moves and which 
stocks and firms are over and undervalued. Fama (1970) also states that if the market 
is efficient, a public announcement of firms M&A activity will react in the market and 
shown in form of changes in the stock prices. So, if one connects the value creation to 
market efficiency theory, a public announcement of deals will be showed in stock 
prices can measure the positive or negative value that is created after an activity such 
as M&A.  
2.1.7. Hubris hypothesis 
 
The role managers play in M&A decision is very important. In many cases the reason 
for acquired M&A strategy is for the managersÕ own personal reason rather than the 
economic gain of the company and the maximization of shareholders wealth. This 
problem of inefficiency is also often called agency problem. Stigler (1950) discusses 
the many reasons for M&A activities and argues that it is often to increase their 
dominant position in the market and to reduce the many competitors in the market. 
However, one should not forget that the higher level of power and high remuneration 
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are also the main motives to M&A activities. Hubris hypothesis was first proposed by 
Roll (1986) stating that managers over-optimistically evaluate mergers higher than the 
actually true economic value.  By being over-optimistic, managers will pay 
excessively for the target company, which consequently reduces their gain at the 
expense of their shareholders wealth (Seth, 1990).  The likelihood of excess payment 
to managers when managing a larger company also creates incentive to push for 
merge even though it might not be the best strategy for the company. Nevertheless, 
this overpayment to target companies will according to Morck et al, (1990) lead to 
them receiving lower stock prices.  
2.2 Why some M&A activities do not ÒsucceedÓ 
 
As seen through out the above discussion it can be clearly stated that a ÒsuccessfulÓ 
merge is when the managerial strategy increases efficiency, profitability and share 
prices, which then ultimately maximise shareholderÕs wealth. If neither of these 
changes occurs, one could argue whether the merge activity actually ÒsucceededÓ. 
Having mentioned this, there are many theories suggesting why some M&A activities 
do not ÒsucceedÓ.  
 
Firstly, Mead (1969) suggests that capital market imperfection is a reason why there 
are failure to estimate the value of the target correctly which consequently leads to 
either over or under estimation of the fair value of the target firm.  Likewise, bidders 
tend to overestimate the value of the target in a competitive bidding situation 
(Mallikarjunappa and Nayak, 2007). Likewise, the assumption that M&A activities 
creates efficiency and profitability to firms, which do not always seem to be precise 
have led to the issue regarding asymmetric information between the acquiring and 
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target firms (Hviid and Prendergast, 1993). Since target firms have an incentive to 
hide any characteristics that may lower the estimation of its value to attract possible 
more bids, can consequently make bidding firms invest in an inadequate expensive 
M&A strategy. This outcome leads to a decrease in acquiring firms profits and share 
prices.  
 
Another factor that prevents the merged firm from fully exploiting theoretical 
efficiency gains may be the failure to successfully integrate the target firm into the 
acquiring business due to partially incompatibility of acquiring and target firms 
(Mallikarjunappa and Nayak, 2007). Because the two firms can differ in size, 
organizational form, strategies, cultures and management policy, it is natural that the 
degree of differences would mostly be difficult to integrate into a single organization. 
Moreover, the issue regarding sizes should be carefully considered due to the fact that 
neither too big target nor too small target is desirable as a partner in order to be a 
successful merge. For instance, when a target is too small, the acquiring firm might 
not be able to give enough time and attention that is necessary to successfully 
establish it. Similarly, when an acquired firm is very large compared to the target firm 
the gain might go to the acquiring firm because of the attention it had received. 
Nevertheless, being acquired by a smaller firm for the reason of gaining more control 
have been experimentally showed that it only results to liquidation for the acquiring 
firm (Hariharan 2005).  
 
Lastly, an alternative reason for failure of mergers or acquisitions are according to 
Achampong and Zemedkun (1995) due to a principal-agent relationship conflict 
between shareholders and managers. Often firms complete deals only to gain control 
of a large corporation since it effectively means higher ÔpromotionÕ such as higher 
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salaries, discretionary payouts resulted from a reduction in competitors and market 
power. As a result, mergers motives and incentives will likely go before the interest of 
their shareholders. Consequently, lower ownership from shareholders lead to less 
ability to control management while management retains more earnings for 
unrestricted spending at the expense of a fall in dividends. 
 
2.3 Previous discussion and test completed on M&A activities. 
 
There have been numerous theories about mergers and acquisitions and several 
empirical studies testing these theories. Researchers have studied the several 
economic impacts of mergers and acquisitions in different industries, testing the 
changes in returns to shareholders after M&A activities and the post-merger 
accounting performance of companies.  Previous literatures have mixed view on the 
marketÕs ability to predict the successfulness of merger and acquisition. However, one 
needs to consider that the different findings might be the result of changing 
environment such as change in deregulation and technology but also different 
countries the study were completed, different data set, and cross board merges. These 
factors make it impossible to assess the potential performance of merged companies. 
Whether performance of merged companies improve is a question, which has been 
examined by many researchers. In this section an attempt has been made to briefly 
review the work and methodology previously undertaken.  
 
An empirical study by Azhagaiah and Kumar (2011) observed that merging firms 
with fine reputation and good managerial skills gained financial benefits and value-
added performance in short term. Vanitha and Selvam (2007) also agree with previous 
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researchers that the financial performance of merged companies improves. 
Nevertheless, Mitchell and Lehn (1990) provided evidence that managers who make 
poor deals increase the likelihood of, becoming targets themselves. Tambi (2005) 
wanted to explore whether the main reason for M&A such as synergy and economies 
of scale really materialized after M&A. The study showed that merger and acquisition 
activities neither provide economies of scale nor synergy.  
 
Yeh and Hoshino (2002) observed the results of mergers on the firms' operating 
performance using a sample of 86 Japanese mergers happening between 1970 and 
1994. The performance of deals was tested based on their effects on firmsÕ efficiency, 
profitability, and growth. The study used total productivity as an indicator of the 
firm's efficiency, return on assets and return on equity as indicators of the firm's 
profitability, and sales and growth in employment to indicate the firm's growth rate. 
The results revealed insignificant negative change in productivity and significant 
negativity in profitability, sales growth rate, and reduction in the workforce after 
mergers. In general, the results determined that mergers have a negative effect on firm 
performance in Japan.  
 
Weston and Mansingka (1971) researched the pre and post-merger performance of 
conglomerate firms and concluded that their earnings rates significantly improved 
before 10 years, but after 10th year, the improvements between post and pre merge 
were not significant. The increase in earnings performance of the conglomerate firms 
was justified as evidence for achieved diversification. Most merger and acquisition 
(M&A) studies have examined only short-term performance after M&A activities in 
firms, leaving the question relating to long-term operating performance unanswered.  
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There has been much discussion whether the performance will be improved in long 
term. According to Andrade et al (2001) Òmergers improve efficiency and that the 
gains to shareholders at merger announcement accurately reflect improved 
expectations of future cash flow performanceÓ (ibid: 117). This is also agreed by 
Kruse et al (2007) used a sample of Japanese companies 56 the long-term operating 
performance of using mergers of manufacturing firms in the period 1969 to 1997 and 
found evidence of improvements in operating performance with highly correlated pre-
and post merger performance. Furthermore, Ikeda and Doi (1983) examined the 
financial performances of 43 merging manufacturing firms in Japanese  
and found that the firmsÕ rate of return on equity increased in most cases, while not in 
all cases when it came to the rate of return on total assets. However, both profit rates 
showed improvement in more than half of the cases between five years time, which 
show that improvement might happen after a longer period.  
 
Recent, studies appeared to have two ways to measure the performance of merged 
firms, which is by using stock market event study approach or by using accounting 
measures. Using stock market to evaluate financial performances is due to the 
assumption that stock market is efficient and the change in stock market can control 
the performance and the value of the economic impact after merged. The use of event 
study for measuring the stock performance of acquiring companies has resulted to 
overall different results. For example, Ravenscraft and Long (2000) studied 65 
pharmaceutical mergers between 1985 and 1996 and found that abnormal stock 
returns around the announcement date was of 13.3% for the target firm and -2.1% for 
the bidding firm, but found no significant difference when the companies were 
combined. The early studies by Franks and Harris (1989) and Asquith et al (1983) 
revealed findings of a significant positive stock performance for acquirers. However 
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for the later studies, many ended up finding significant negative returns meaning no 
experience of shareholders value created. For instance, Sudarsanam and MagateÕs 
(2003) short term event study of 519 UK acquirers between 1983 and 1995 reported 
significantly negative abnormal returns of 1.4% over a 2 (-1 to+1) days period. The 
result even showed that some bidder firms experienced wealth losses over the chosen 
event window. 
 
Nevertheless, with several recent long-term event studies assessing negative abnormal 
returns over the five years following the completion of the merge makes one cast 
doubt over the result that the traditional short-window event study have found. For 
instance, long-run studies such as LimmackÕs (1991) study of UK firms between 1977 
and 1986 reported significant negative returns for his sample of 448 firms. Likewise 
so was the outcome of Gregory«s (1997), study of takeovers between 1984 and 1992 
and so did Alexandridis et al. (2006) study with their use of the three-factor model 
and the traditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM) methodology which both 
resulted in a negative abnormal return of around -1%. Gregory and McCorriston 
(2005) also found a higher lost of -9,36% and -27% in third and fifth year following 
the activity.  
Loughran and Vijh (1997) also calculated long-term abnormal returns for acquiring 
firms using different payment methods such as stock and cash financing over the 
period 1970-1989. They found that acquiring firms using stock financing have 
abnormal returns of -24.2% over the five-year period after the deals, whereas the 
abnormal return was 18.5% for cash mergers. 
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Furthermore, Franks et al (1991) study covered 399 US takeovers between 1975-1985 
and found a small insignificant negative return to shareholders of the acquiring firms 
of -1.02%. Supporting findings came from Boone & MulherinÕs (2008) study sample 
of 138 US acquirers over a nine years period. The finding came to be negative return 
of -0.37% and -0.92%. Also, Anand and Singh (2008) found that merger 
announcement in the Indian banking industry have positive significant performance in 
both target and acquired shareholders. Soongswang«s (2009) observation of Thai 
takeovers summarized that M&A create values of the successful bidding firmÕs 
shareholders.  
 
Likewise, Meeks (1977) used a sample of 233 acquiring UK quoted companies over 
1964 to 1972. His research carefully studied the rate of return and discovered that all 
the seven years except for the first year after the merger had a declined profitability, 
which suggest that acquisition has a negative effect on profitability in short run but 
probably not in the long run. While Becker et al (2008) found negative stock price 
performance for acquired firms which did perform not as good as firms that did not 
engage in M&A activity. Supporting that result was Asquith et al (1983) who 
suggested that regardless the chosen event window, there is very little that support the 
view that merger and acquisition do create positive return to shareholders. He 
confirmed a 10 percent loss of the acquiring firms over the five years after acquisition 
completion. This suggests that in recent years, mergers and acquisitions have become 
less valuable adding to shareholders, which makes the market efficiency theory very 
inconsistent. Similarly, Magenheim and Mueller (1988) examined the longer-term 
market reaction and found that stock of the acquiring firms declined over a long-term 
period after the acquisition, which may suggest that the wealth to the acquiring firm 
could simply been transferred from acquired stockholders to target stockholders.  
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Asquith et al (1983) reported CAARs of Ð0.072 in the 240 days following merger 
outcome. This return was statistically significant, which provides strong evidence 
against all previous negative abnormal return results. While, Langetieg (1978) reports 
CAARs between -0.223 and -0.2615 over a 70 months period using four different 
statistical methods. Malatesta (1983) finds statistically significant abnormal returns 
for the year after the first public announcement of merger but insignificant results for 
the year after completion of the deal. Limmack (1991) also assessed the performance 
of post-acquisition over two years with significantly negative CAARs results for two 
of his three methodologies. Loughran & Vijh (1997) summarized the result from 
numerous studies and came up with the conclusion that the only one that do gain from 
the deal transactions is target firmÕs stockholders due to the fact that the acquiring 
firmÕs only gain negative abnormal return from the transaction. 
 
However, there are other researchers that do not agree with the negative long-term 
performance and several studies that reports a smaller positive return to acquirer 
shareholders including Bradley et al (1988), who found evidence of significant 
positive return of 0.97% in a US sample in the time period 1963-1984 of 161 tender 
offers. Furthermore, Tuch and OÕsullivant (2007) recent literature found that only a 
third of acquiring companies experience wealth gains. Furthermore, Andrade et al 
(2001) used three days event window when combining both target and acquirer data 
and reported an abnormal return from 1.4% to 2.6%, and averaging 1.8% overall for 
the 3,688 completed mergers sample size. His study indicated that mergers do create 
shareholder value on average. This result is supported by Yuce and Ng (2005) study 
that did find a significant positive abnormal return for both the target and acquiring 
companyÕs shareholders. Laabs and Schiereck (2010) used 230 data set of takeovers 
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firms from the automotive supply industry from the period of 1981 to 2007 to analyze 
the long-term performance of acquirer. They found that acquirers do gain in short 
term return but construct a diminishing effect in stock return from 20% to 16% over a 
long-term. Agrawal et al (1992) found a statistically significant five-year CAAR of -
0.1026 under a size and beta adjustment.  
 
Other studies like Anderson and Mandelker (1993) reported five-year CAARs of Ð
0.0956 and Ð0.0931, under a size and a size & book-to-market (b/m) adjustment, 
respectively. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) found a statistically significant three-year 
CAAR of Ð0.0404. Campbell and Gosh (2001) conducted a study on the short-run 
wealth effects of M&A in the real estate sector and found positive abnormal returns to 
target companies around the announcement day confirming the inefficient 
management hypothesis. This hypothesis states that abnormal returns to target firm 
shareholders are larger if cash is the chosen method of payment rather than stock. 
They used a sample of REIT mergers from 1994-1998 and found that in public-public 
REIT mergers acquirers earn CARs of -0.60%, while acquirers of public-private REIT 
mergers earn CARs of 1.90% surrounding the announcement day.  
Recent studies use of US firms as data set did as other previous studies conclude mix 
result of whether M&A creates profitability. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987a) use of 
US companies as data set differed with the Meeks (1977) in that they used some 
business data to be able to monitor the performance of the acquired company. Their 
data set were taken from year 1950 to 1977. They found that in 47 % of the pre-
acquired cases there were significant declines in profitability. Jensen and Ruback 
observed a 25 years long period (81956-1981) by means of event studies. According 
to them, the targetÕs share prices increased by 20-30 percent (Jensen and Ruback, 
1993). A fifth study examining the short-run wealth effects of M&A in the real estate 
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sector was conducted by McIntosh et al. (2001) and found positive abnormal returns 
of 5.29% to takeover targets surrounding the announcement day. Other studies of 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987b) focused on tender offers and their study found that 
although the post-acquired profitability declines, it is not statically significant. Many 
studies either confirmed previous results or found little changes, which lead to other 
studies in this area. (Ikeda and Doi, 1983, Kumar, 1984).  
 
The second method to measure merger performances involves examining the 
operating indicators for firms before and after deals to determine the fluctuations 
associated with the deal. These studies emphasis on accounting rates of return, profit 
margins, cash flow returns, expense ratios, or any other accounting and financial 
ratios and estimators. Each measure has its proponents and critics. These studies try to 
control the factors by comparing the post- acquisition changes in financial 
performance to industry averages or to use multiple regressions to study the 
significant statistics of the result. According to Kangari (1988) financial ratio can be 
used to analysis information from financial statements to access the strengths and 
weaknesses of merge or acquired firms.  
There have been many different results while using this form of measurement. For 
instance, a study of Surjit (2002) examines the M&A activity in India during the post 
liberalization period. The study tested the changes of select financial ratios after deals 
in India. Furthermore, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) found out by using accrual 
accounting variables that target performances declines during the post-merger period 
related to that of the pre-merger period. Cabanda and Pajara-Pascual (2007) examined 
the financial and operating performance of Philippines shipping companies from 
period 1994 to 2003 using the accounting performance variables such as net income, 
return on asset, return on sales, return on equity, net profit margin, capital 
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expenditure, capital expenditure/sales, and capital expenditure/total assets to analyze 
the effects of both short (three years prior to merger) and long run (seven years after 
the merger) period merger on firm performance. All these performance variables did 
not show significant gains after mergers in both in short-run and the long- run. 
Nevertheless, Ramakrishna (2008) study found that merged firms performed fine 
during their post-merger period on average with respect to the pre-merger period. 
While, Kruse et al (2007) and their 69 non-financial merged firms discovered that 
their operating performances improved during the five years post merger period as 
compared to their five years pre-merger period. Furthermore, Vanitha and Selvam 
(2007) found significant increase in the operating performance for 6 merged firms; 
whereas 17 merged firms showed insignificant increase in their operating profits. 
Demirbag and Tatoglu (2007) examined the post mergers performance by using the 
performing valuables Return on Investment and Net Profit Margin and discovered that 
the profit margin improved with respect to the pre merger years but remained at 
constant against their competitors.  
Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003) tested Hong Kong merged companiesÕ long-term 
post-merger financial performance of in by using operating cash flow returns on 
market value of assets as the measure of performance, with a sample consisting of 162 
pre-and post-merging firms from 1975 to 1990. Their study revealed a positive 
significant improvement in the post-merger performance and firms in different 
industries "conglomerate mergers" experienced better post-merger financial 
performance than in comparison to firms in same industries. However, mergers 
happening during the years 1983 to 1990 experienced worse post-merger performance 
in contrast to those before 1983.  
King et al. (2004) investigation contradicted the Ramaswamy and Waegelein«s (2003) 
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findings suggesting that M&A do not lead to superior financial performance but 
rather to a modest negative effect on long-term financial performance of acquiring 
firms. Similarly, Mantravadi and Reddy (2008a) tested whether the size market target 
and acquiring firms for both when it comes to the post-merger operating performance 
in India with sample containing of all the acquiring transactions happening in the 
period from 1991 to 2003. The study used financial ratios such as operating profit 
margin ratio, gross profit margin ratio, net worth, return on capital employed, and 
debt equity ratio covering a three years pre-merges and five years post-merger. The 
result indicated that relative size is differential to post-merger performance. 
Therefore, there was a decline in net profit margin ratio and return on capital 
employed along with an increase in financial leverage after merger for medium sized 
firms. While for larger size target firms which are greater than acquiring firms had 
significant reduction in returns on net worth capital employed and a increase in 
financial leverage. But, firms with relative large size had no difference in pre and 
post-merger performance.  
Sirower and OÕByrne (1998) also used accounting performance for merging firms, but 
used economic value added as their changed accounting measure. They followed the 
firmsÕ accounting performance for five years and compared it to the short-run 
predictions of the stock market around the time of the merger. They found that the 
accounting outcomes matched the short-run stock market predictions in 66 % of 
cases. Ghosh (2001) examined whether operating performance are different across 
cash and stock acquisitions and ascertained whether improvements in operating 
performance are driven by sales- or cost. His results indicate that cash flows increase 
significantly by about 3% per year following cash acquisitions, while the 
enhancements in performance was resulted from higher sales growth and not because 
of cost reductions. Therefore, one can argue that better management of merging 
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firmsÕ resources result to an increase in operating performance. Pawaskar (2001) 
found that the shareholders of the acquirer companies increased their liquidity 
performance after the merger. Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003) found that there is 
an improvement in post-merger operating financial performance measured by 
industry-adjusted return on assets. In conclusion, Kumar and Rajib (2007) study on 
profitability shows that merged firms do have a lower profitability than firms that did 
not merge. 
 
Recently, studies have appeared to combine the accounting measures and stock 
market event study approaches. When both measurements are applied to relatively 
large samples of deals, the study can provide result on whether value is created in 
both short and long term but also provide indications of the results consistency. For 
instance, Healy et al (1992) combined financial accounting analysis and stock market 
event study techniques to examine the post-merger outcomes of 50 large mergers 
occurring between 1979 and 1984. The authors found that post-merge industry-
adjusted net cash flow rates of return were around 3 percentage points higher after the 
merger. While Limmack (1991) found that there is a long run improvement in 
operating cash flow performance of merged companies. Kumar and Rajib (2007) 
studied the impact on the shareholder value after merger, completely using accounting 
measure. By using book value of asset and sales model, the study found that corporate 
performance improves after merger. While Kukalis (2007) and Yook (2004) found 
that the acquirer firmÕs pre-merger performance are partly higher than the post merger 
performance of merged firms. While Dickerson et al (1997) study show that acquired 
firms have lower growth with a reduction in profitability. Furthermore, Fuller et al 
(2002) discovered that the bidder shareholders created value when purchasing a 
private firm or subsidiary than when purchasing a public firm, and Boone and 
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Mulherin (2008) discovered the inverse relation between bidder returns and takeover 
competition. 
However, the profit theory by Mead (1969) poses a different perspective. In his work, 
he defines merger profit as Òan instantaneous increase in the earnings per share of an 
acquiring company, due solely to the merger and totally independent of operating 
efficiency, market power, or other causes of increased profitability that may accrue 
with the passage of timeÓ (ibid: p.296). By looking at the level of merger profit 
dependence on firm size, he discovered that the larger the acquired firm, the larger the 
merger profit for the acquiring firm would be. Mead tested this theory with numbers 
of different hypothesis tests. Mead used a sample of 122 mergers and carried out a 
two-tail test to test the PE ratios of acquiring and acquired firms at a 5 % significant 
level. The result turned out to be insignificant for horizontal but insignificant for 
vertical mergers. His results supported his theory that merge firms profit are highly 
relevant as far as conglomerate mergers are concerned. 
Furthermore, Ooghe et al (2006) found that the profitability, liquidity and solvency of 
M&A company declines. Pazarskis et al (2006) found that the profitability of firms 
decreases due to merger/acquisition event. According to Kumar (2009) the post-
merger profitability, assets turnover and solvency of the acquiring companies show no 
enhancement compared with pre- merger values. In fact, mergers usually do not lead 
to improvement of the acquirerÕs financial performance. MuellerÕs (1980) used the 
accounting measures like size, profitability, growth and leverage, to study the 
performance characteristics of takeover firms in the pre Ð and post Ð takeover periods. 
While Canagavally (2000) also added growth, risk of the companies before and after 
merger. The researcher also investigated the share prices in response to the 
announcement of merger. Marimuthu (2008) also found that post acquisition showed 
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higher growth rate for lower sales growth companies but suffered decreases in their 
mean P/E ratios, mean EPS and mean dividend payouts, whereas, high sales growth 
companies showed lower rates of growth. The similar pattern of inconsistency was 
found in the high sales growth companies with their EPS, PE ratio, earnings and 
dividend payouts being greater. 
 
Some of the more current evidence in this classification comes from studies 
comparing pre-merger and post-merger performance of firms in one industry at the 
time. For instance, a decline in the operating performance in terms of profitability of 
the merged firms was observed in different industries by few researchers. Mantravadi 
& Reddy (2008b) found that the operating performance of non financial institution, 
textile, pharmaceuticals and electrical industry gave negative impact on the overall 
operating performance of the mergers and even experiencing losses on the chemical 
and agriculture-products industries. The Chemicals and agri-products sectors, 
performance after mergers declined in returns on investment and profitability 
margins. Similarly, pharmaceuticals, textiles and electrical equipment sectors saw a 
marginal decrease in performance in terms of profitability and returns on investment.  
When it comes to merged banks and merged firms in financial industries (ibid) found 
that mergers have positive impact on profitability of firms in the banking and finance 
industry. DeYoung et al (2009) showed that commercial bank merger during the 
1980s and early 1990s using accounting ratio had an improvement in cost efficiency 
profit. Also, Kwan and Wilcox (2002) found evidence of significant cost reductions in 
their study of U.S. bank mergers during the 1990s, but only after adjusting the data 
for merger accounting rules. Consistent with this, Knapp et al (2006) found that bank 
holding company (BHC) mergers between 1987 and 1998 generated profit gains up to 
five years post-merger, after adjusting annual BHC profits to the average industry 
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trend. Cornett et al (2006) found evidence of revenue efficiency improvements for 
large mergers, product focused mergers. Hannan and Pilloff (2006) used examine the 
features of acquired banks between 1996 and 2003 and showed that cost-efficient 
banks tend to acquire less inefficient targets.  
 
A change in method of study was done by Heron and Lie (2002) who investigated the 
relationship between the method of payment, earnings management and operating 
performance by using accounting methods. Their first study compared the pre-merger 
performance of the merged firms with similar industry. Second, the study compared 
the post- merger performance with industry-adjusted performance. Both studies came 
out to be that acquiring firms show superior operating performance relative to their 
industry competitors close to acquisition and continue positive performance level in 
excess of their respective industries. Loughran and Vijh (1997) also calculated long-
term abnormal returns for acquiring firms using different payment methods such as 
stock and cash financing over the period 1970-1989. They found that acquiring firms 
using stock financing have abnormal returns of -24.2% over the five-year period after 
the deals, whereas the abnormal return was 18.5% for cash mergers. 
 
Travlos (2009) also studied the relationship between different methods of payments 
for bidding firms around announcement date. The result stated that stockholders 
experience significant normal rate of return around announcement period if the 
bidding firm pay with cash.  However, with stock finance the stockholders receive a 
significant loss at the announcement day. The author supported the result by 
regression analysis with AR as depending variable and relative size and methods of 
payment as independent variables. Yang (2008) investigated the determinant of the 
payments in merger and acquisitions. He found that acquiring hospitality cash 
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payments shareholdersÕ in the long term received more positive abnormal return of 
15.51% (t= 3.89) while stock payment shareholdersÕ receives significant negative 
return of 2.37% (t-2.35).  The study also controlled size for bidders and found a 
significant negative impact on cash offers while a more positive return on stock 
offers. The study also showed that the cash offers finance heavily decreased three 
months after the deal.  
 
Many other authors have argued that the profit decline regardless of the methods used 
to measure performance, although it was greatest where the acquiring firm used stock 
payments. Asquith (1983) studied the abnormal return related to factors such as the 
methods of payment made to the target company and the size of the bidder and target 
firm. He discovered that small firms get significant better return than large firms 
around the event period by 2.24%. He suggests that large bidder firms experience 
significant shareholders wealth loss when the pay with cash but increases as smaller 
the bidder firm is.  
Authors argue that the profit decline was likely due to a loss of managerial control by 
the acquiring firms. Others such as Beena (2000) concluded that the post merger 
positive performance in the early 1990s was matched by the dominance of mergers 
between firms in the same industry with similar product lines. While Ding et al (2010) 
found evidence that the performances of firms vary over business cycle.  Overall, 
some research results indicate mix views. It is either a decline in profitability post-
acquisition, a positive abnormal return and performance or just a little improvement. 
Studies in this area either confirm the same negative results or find little change in 
performance following acquisition (Kumar, 1984). In summary, the few studies done 
on performance of M&A activities, have reported mixed results, with findings raging 
from slightly positive to significant negatively after post Ðmergers. 
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2.4 Mergers and Acquisition activities in the US 
 
Before one discusses the 20th centuryÕ M&A activity, one needs to look closer at the 
previous five periods of waves in the history of M&A activities. According to many 
research, all the previous waves were caused by some shock or modification in 
industries, economy, regulation and technology modifications, some times even a 
shock in those places (Gaughan, 2002).  High levels of M&A activity described each 
wave. Some of the firms being first movers while other firms followed what other 
firms did. However, all the waves were followed by a serious decrease in deals. The 
first wave started during the depression in 1983, where the primarily motive were 
monopoly power (Nelson, 1959). It was a period of economic expansion, especially in 
miming and manufacturing industries. The second wave was much smaller than the 
first, perhaps due to it being around World War I. The concern about the abused of 
power from the monopolies firms made the American Supreme Court illegalise this 
activity. For instance, the interruption of Rockerfeller EmpireÕs merge had to be made 
due to the concern of monopolies. The problem regarding monopolies led to an 
oligopolistic industry structure in the second wave. However, the second wave 
collapsed with the market crash in 1929 and worsens with the depression in the next 
four years, and turned many firms into bankruptcy (Sundarsanam, 2003).  
 
The third wave in 1965 was characterized by the motivation of growth and a high 
level of M&A activity. This wave was all about conglomerate merge where smaller 
companies often targeted larger companies, which had not been done in previous 
waves. Meanwhile, the fourth wave in 1984 to 1989 was all about hostile mergers and 
megamergers in industries such as oil and gas, drugs and medical equipment. The 
wave also lead to the start of diversifying strategies, leveraged buyout, development 
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of products and techniques in order to prevent bankruptcy and takeovers, a more debt 
financing strategy and international targets. However, the wave slowed down around 
the 90Õs (Ibid, 2003). 
The last and fifth wave in 1992 started off with an increase in numbers of M&A again 
but in this wave most of the deals were financed by increased used of equity. The 
emergence of Internet and telecommunication created new industries and capabilities, 
which generated more M&A opportunities. The emerging market deals also 
developed under the fifth wave, which largely made M&A activities, a worldwide 
phenomenon (ibid, 2003) 
 
Mergers and acquisitions have become an important strategy in USA and more deals 
are now taking place in the USA than in any other country in the world. In the 1990s 
mergers and acquisitions in the United States increased rapidly. These activities 
improved the overall US economy due to the jobs and business were created under 
this period. These days, it is not only big companies that are more likely to undergo 
mergers or acquisition, but also small companies acquiring other small ones in order 
to keep them in the game. Industries such as Banks, Insurance, Real estate, 
Investment services and technology services are among the top sectors in terms of 
mergers and acquisitions in the USA. An average of 6.4 percent of firms in this area 
were merged or acquired during the period of 1990-1994. A total of 100000 firms 
were merged over the first half of 1990s and over 1.6% of them were small firms that 
were merged or acquired between 1990 and 1994. In the 20th century, there were a 
more of a mixture of M&A activities in US, which was viewed as a positive start of 
the 21st century but slowly and steadily dropped after the year 2009. Since it is said 
that merger and acquisition activity often picks up when stock prices are higher, this 
best describes the activities of 2007, when the stock market was at its peak and the 
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merger or acquisition increased. In that year, increase in M&A activities in US made 
buyers overly confidence of their ability to buy target companies to create gains. 
However, that peak was only a short live. During the financial crisis in 2009 when 
stocks where reaching their bottom forms, the M&A activities started to decrease and 
dropped from $250 billion in the first quarter of 2009 to $200 billion in the second 
quarter and $130 billion in the third, says (Krant, 2012).  
 
Despite remaining concerns for the global economy and financing difficulties of the 
last years, there continues to be a steadily M&A activity in the US. This suggests that 
the importance of growth still remains top priority for firms. According to Thomson 
Reuters data, merger volume rose 14.2 percent in US during 2010. The industries 
whose deals doubled its market share have been energy and power. Those industries 
have rose from 12.5 percent to 28.1 percent in 2010 (Thomson Reuters, 2010) Other 
rises in M&A market in 2010 was the growth in emerging markets. One of the biggest 
themes in mergers and acquisitions was in the Asia-Pacific region. Those deals rose 
43.5 percent, according to Thomson Reuters (2010). According to S&P (2012), the 
foreign buyer and investor acquisition has almost increased over the domestic M&A 
activity since 2008. In 2000 the American M&A was around 1702.4 with 363.1 of 
them being foreign acquisitions (21.3%). In 2000 the foreign acquisitions declined to 
8% due to the global financial situation.  
Despite some growth in US M&A deals in 2010, the M&A activity continued to be 
weaken in 2011 and in the few quarters of 2012. This could be due to the distresses 
over European debt and a pullback in financing (PwC, 2012). From figure 1, it is clear 
that the number of M&A activities is starting to increase from the weaken M&A 
activity due to the global financial distress. However, one can see that the M&A 
activity was still normally steadily even though the world was hit by financial 
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recession.  
 
Figure 1; Note: source from S&P Capital IQ  
 
3 Research data and methodology 
 
This chapter outlines the research design and methodology adopted in this study. The 
chapter begins with a brief review of the research method available and the method 
used. The chapter also includes the sample selection criteria and the collection of 
relevant information. The final part of the chapter examines the selection of data, 
methods of measurements and the statistic producers used in examining the research 
objectives. 
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3.1 Data 
 
In order to assess the real financial performance of merged and acquiring companies, 
the performance of firms stock return for participate industries and period is going to 
be examined. It is in the studyÕs knowledge that stock return data is a good way to 
investigate companiesÕ performances because if mergers and acquisition activities are 
effective then the impact on the operational efficiency and or profitability will appear 
in the published stock return. But one needs to remember that stock performance can 
be seen as a measurement of investorsÕ expectation rather than actual return which 
makes some researchers prefer accounting data to measure the actual performance 
conditions. However, accounting performance can be easily affected by managerial 
decisions, which make stock and return performance a more truthful view of financial 
performances. If one supports the theory of market efficiency, stock prices will adjust 
instantaneously to new information and any changes in companies. So if the market is 
efficient with respect to mergers activities, then any information about M&A 
activities could possibly be shown in the stock prices. Consequently, by measuring 
the announce days and the days after the completion of the deal one can really study 
the firms stock return performances and then investigate whether M&A activity 
acquiring firms cerates value in short-term.  
This study consists of 100 listed acquiring American firms from different US 
industries, involved in M&A activities occurring between 1998-2011.  All the used 
firms are listed on American stock index such as New York stock exchange or 
NASDAQ. The acquiring stock information such as daily stock return and daily 
value-weighted market return was collected from Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP), a stock database from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The 
announced date, completed date, method of payments and transaction value were 
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collected from Thomson Financial database and companies website published 
announcements. The methods of payments and market capitalization figures came 
also from WRDS. 
The data met the following criteria: (i) the deals must have been completed, (ii) the 
firms need to be available in CRSP, in other words, it must be listed on the American 
stock exchange during the relevant period, (iii) the deal must be domestic, i.e both the 
target and acquirer are American based firms, (iv) the acquiring firms should not have 
multiple acquisitions during the relevant period to limit biasness, (v) deals with all 
sites of transaction value were considered, (vi) it is acceptable if the acquired firm is 
small relative to the acquiring firm, (vii) all announcement and completion dates need 
to be available. 
Table 3.1 in appendix, reports key descriptive of the listed deals, broken down by 
decade. The screening of the data to meet the criteria above led to a final sample of 
100 deals. The descriptive statistics of the completed companies involved in M&A 
activities are mixed. For each industry the numbers are reported for the acquirer. The 
industries are mixed from mineral, manufacturing and service industries to some 
insurance and financial firms.  
                      
  37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table shows a mixer of industries. The finance industry includes: real estate, insurance, investment 
banking and other financial institutions. Services industry includes: consumer products and services. Retail 
industry includes: retails. Utility industry includes: energy. Others includes: waste management, tobacco, personal 
care, trucks & other vehicles, conglomerate, defense and security. Manufactory industry includes: companies that 
produce materials. Food and beverage industry includes: producing and deliver food and beverage. Media industry 
includes: newspaper, entertainments. 
 
It is in the studyÕs knowledge that accounting data is also a good way to investigate 
companiesÕ performances because if mergers and acquisition activities are effective 
then the impact on the operational efficiency and or profitability will appear in the 
published accounts. But one needs to remember that accounting performance can be 
easily affected by managerial decisions, which makes comparing different industries 
to each other difficult. However, proponents of this methodology argue that 
accounting data measure actual performance and not the investorsÕ expectation, which 
makes it somewhat more reliable than the first approach, which uses equity, returns. 
Table 1
Industry Acquirer
Biotechnology 7 7%
Pharmaceutical 8 8%
Airlines 1 1%
Manufactury 7 7%
Financial 9 9%
Utility 5 5%
Real estate 7 7%
Service 6 6%
Media 3 3%
Food producer 4 4%
Oil and gas 6 6%
Retail 4 4%
Telecommunications 5 5%
Computer hardware and Software 5 5%
Others 20 20%
healthcare 3 3%
Total 100 100%
Sample Industry Distribution
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Thus, an accounting performance analysis over a sufficiently long period of 22 years 
should reveal whether or not merged companies entail real financial gains. 
 
Throughout this study, the variables subjected to analyses were taken over large data 
of pre and post-acquisition from different US industries a period of 22 years between 
1989 and 2011. The accounting information was collected from the Wharton 
Research Data Services (WRDS). The WDRS database provides information about 
firmsÕ balance sheet and income statement items such as fixed assets, current assets, 
total liabilities including short-term and long- term debt, sales and expenses. 
3.2 Methodology 
  
Throughout the short-run event study, the methodology of Linn and McConnell 
(1983) and Brown &Warner (1980) 1 is going to be used following their calculation of 
event effect-daily abnormal return (ARs) and cumulated return (CARs). These models 
follow FamaÕs (1970) market efficiency theory, which implies that one can 
investigate firmsÕ performances by looking at past stock performance. Consequently, 
the use of event study as a measurement approach assumes that all stocks perform 
similarly to a market index adjusted by the risk related with the stock (ibid).  
Event study methodology is a way to measure the stock performances and the 
abnormal returns. Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al (1969) introduced the event 
study methodology, which is used heavily when measuring abnormal return.  In order 
to analyse whether value creates as a result of the event, it is important to detect 
abnormal return. The efficient market efficient is available in three forms; weak, 
semi-strong and strong, depending on how the information absorbs into stock prices. 
                                                        
1 
 
See Brown and Warner (1980) for more and different market model with respect to the market and risk-adjusted 
model. 
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Weak form efficiency assumes that all historical information public information 
reflects in stock prices. The semi-strong form assumes available public information is 
incorporated in stock prices. Finally, the strong form assumes that both public and 
private information is to be showed in stock prices.  
Many researchers have argued that the methods used to calculate long-run abnormal 
stock returns are not flawless and often lead to bias tests such as skewed or 
rebalancing biasness and an extremely misleading performance measurement (Blume 
and Stambaugh, 1983). That is why selection of proper benchmark, the choice 
between, CAPM, market model, the three-factor model of Fama et al (1993) or the 
choice between an equally or market value weighted index becomes very essential 
(Kothari and Warner, 1997).  
 
According to them, CAR represents the return on portfolio, which in this case is 
reweighted every period to present the equal dollar exposure. This constant 
reweighting causes price measurement error such as non-spread price fluctuation, 
price rounding and other sort of errors that can cause serious unattainable spurious 
abnormal returns (Dimson and Marsh, 1986). To summarize the discussion from 
many authors, daily long returns and longer observation period could lead to a more 
bias CAR. Since the long-term performance measure can potentially raise serious 
biasness this study is using a short-run daily rather than monthly returns. According to 
Dimson and Marsh (1986) study, short-term studies do not need to take concern of the 
possible biasness in the study, which makes the importance of the accurate choice of 
benchmark not to affect the mergers or acquired shareholders performance. As 
covered above, this study is going to use the choice of market equal weight value 
index as market return attributes.  
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The Methodology of Brown & Warner (1980, 1985) suggest that expected return is 
determined by the capital asset pricing model, which states the correlation between 
risk and expected return. The cumulated abnormal return framework is then 
calculated with formula: 
                      (1) 
      Where 
           ARit: Abnormal Return is the return for firm in time period i  
 Rit: the arte of return for firm i in time period t  
 Rmt: is the value-weighted market index return. 
     
                             (2) 
        
                 (3) 
 
The abnormal return (AR) is the difference between the actual return and expected 
return. CAR is in that turn the average of a summarized abnormal for each stock for a 
specific period. 
      
Even though there are many version of the CAR, this study 
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uses the standard derivation of AR to test the statistical significance at 10% (90%) 5% 
(95%) and 1% (99%) level respectively2 .   
 
In order to perform an event study one needs to determine the event day, the event 
window and the estimation period. Despite numerous statically studies of the stock 
performances related to merger announcement one can argue that the entire value 
creation of deals will only be shown after the completion of acquisition which is why 
both the announce and completed dates are used in this study. Additionally, to be able 
to follow the criteria of eliminating companies with multiple acquirers to remove 
noise, the study uses a 28 and 5 trading day event window period (t -7, t +20), (t -2, t 
+2), around the public announcement of acquisition and completion with an 
estimation window of 130 days (t -30, t -100). Elton et al (2003) state that stock prices 
might react over the time and not on the same day, so when examining the abnormal 
return one needs to analyse the abnormal return around the time interval both after 
and before the announcement day. According to Armitage (1995), an estimation 
window can be different length. It is common to choose a higher estimation, which is 
why this study is using 130 and 90 days which agreeing with Armitage is sufficient 
enough to perform the event study.  
 
The statistic market model used in this study is already shown above. To be able to 
estimate the expected return of the acquiring company, a regression on the market 
index is made, which estimates the parameters α and β by constructing an OLS 
regression in STATA. 
   
                                                        
2 The P-value test is preferred to a t-test due to it allows us to use robust standard errors. If the p-value is smaller 
than the significance level, 0.001*, 0.05** and 0.100*** the value is statistically significant. 
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STATA, which is a statistical software package, is used to explore the parametric test 
for the market model detailed above. In order to run the data successfully, each 
company has to have sufficient number of observations between the suggested event 
windows.  This is done by cleaning the data from insufficient observation by creating 
a variable dif that equals to 1 if the observation lies within the chosen event window 
(28 trading days, 5 trading days) and one that lies within estimation window (130 
trading days, 90 trading days). All the companies with insufficient observations drop 
automatically. But before testing the abnormal performance the need to calculate the 
SDit is important. The standard derivation is calculated as the standard deviation of 
the abnormal return during the estimated time period.  
 
        
 
 
Lastly, in order to test for abnormal performance, statistical tests are performed.  The 
t-test is used to find out whether or not the CAR is significant different from zero. The 
statistic test is calculated for the all event windows [-7;+20],[-2;+2]. T-test calculates 
the difference between two means. When performing a t-test, there are some 
assumptions concerning the probability distribution that must hold in order to fully 
trust the results of the test (Eriksen and M¿ller, 2008). These assumptions are 
normality, independently and identically distributed abnormal returns, an excepted 
value of the abnormal returns of zero, and a constant variance.  These assumptions are 
critical in order to certify the strength of the test by looking at the observationsÕ 
significant statistics (ibid).  
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3.2.1 Determination and definition of the firm size, relative size and payment 
method 
 
According to Asquith (1983), the cumulated abnormal return will differ depending on 
firmsÕ size and the type of payment announced charged by the bidders. To determine 
whether the performance is in correlation with factors such as firm size and payment 
methods, this study followed Asquith (1983) and Travlos (2009), relative size is 
defined as the value of transaction divided by the market value of equity. The 
determination of firm size is divided by Small and Large. The author (ibid) defined 
small (large) firms as being equal or smaller (larger) then the 25th percentile of NYSE 
firms at that year. The payment methods used when acquiring firms in this study are 
cash, stock and mix which are created by dummy variables. Regression is used to 
estimate the relationship between the CAR and the independent variables firm size, 
relative size and payment method.  
 
3.2.2 Determination and definition of the selected performance figures 
 
To examine the profitability implications of merge activities, the study analyze the 
performance using the methodology from Barber and Lyon (1997) and Healy et al 
(1992) and Cornett et al (2006). The difference between the pre- and post-merger 
years mean performance measure is then worked out. To confirm the results and 
significant differences of the test the study uses Paired sample t-test, which is used to 
get the significant differences between the mean of deals years. 
 
The performance indicators consist of variables capturing post-merged profitability 
and operational efficiency. This treatment should indicate whether any observed gains 
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are attributable to revenue or to cost effects. The traditional measures of profitability 
are calculated both before and after are Return on assets (ROA), gross profit and 
EBITDA. Other performance indicators are Leverage variable such as Debt ratio and 
Liquidity variables current ratio. The comparison of the relative performance 
indicators for mergers and acquisition allow a test of the hypothesis.  
 
The operating performance variables are: 
  
Return on assets    
The variable is defined as the earning before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization over the value of total assets.  Return on assets (ROA) measures how 
efficiently companies are using their assets in order to generate profits. The higher the 
ROA the more efficient the company is generating earnings. The smaller the ROA the 
harder it is for the company to generate earning and the dependent they are on funds. 
This variable will be used to measure the accounting performance of acquiring 
performance.  According to Barber and Lyon (1997), return on assets is one of the 
most influential measurements for evaluating firm performance, which is not effected 
by capital structure of a company.            
EBITDA 
EBITDA margin is defined as Earning before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization divided by total revenue. Earning before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) measure companies operating probability. EBITDA provides 
an investor with clearer view of a companyÕs profitability due to execution of non-
cash items.  
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Gross profit margin 
 
Gross profit margin is defined as revenue subtracted by cost of good sold. It gives an 
indication of revenue after considering the cost of good sold. A more efficient 
company typically have higher profit margins. 
 
Debt ratio  
 
The ratio is calculated by dividing total debt with total assets. A lower debt indicates a 
financial opportunity to borrow in the future without any significant risks. Debt ratio 
measures the quantity of debt a company has comparative to its assets. The ratio 
indicates the leverage of the company and their potential to handle their future debts.  
 
Current ratio  
 
Current ratio is defined as the current assets divided by current liabilities. It shows an 
indication of companyÕs ability to short-term debt obligations. The higher the ratio, 
the more liquid the company seems to obtain. An exceeding current asset may have 
difficulties meeting its short-term obligations.  
 
Total assets turnover 
 
Total assets turnover also measures companiesÕ ability to use their assets to produce 
revenue. However, instead of using profit, the total asset turnover ratio uses revenue. 
So the Total assets turnover is defined as sale revenue divided by total assets. The 
higher the ratio, the more sales can companiesÕ produce based on its assets. 
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4. Result and discussions 
4.1 Stock performance result 
The figures of the study represent in table 2 is the result of the AR on the 100 
acquiring companies between the dates of public announcement using the formulas 
above. With an average announcement period significant abnormal return of -1,273% 
(t=-3.6) and the largest obtained AR not being on the announcement date but on day 
+8 with 0.463% return (t=1.54), there are virtually no gains when it comes to America 
acquiring companies in period 1998 to 2011 at the announcement day. This implies 
that the stock market is expected little negative change in the profitability of firms 
once the deal is announced. This finding of the firmsÕ performance may not be fully 
consistent with the theory that the market fully adjusts to mergers or acquisition news 
at the time of announcements but then decrease after the overexcitement reduces. 
Some of the reasons could be the fact that the announcement was made too late for 
the stock to react to it because to the market was perhaps closed which makes the 
reflection in the stock occur after the actual announcement, which seems to be the 
case in table 2. The table shows a positive insignificant return of 0.179%, an increase 
of 1.14% on day +1 after announcement date over the event window, which suggests 
that the abnormal return does not react to the news on the day of announcement but 
more or less a day after the announcement.  
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Table 2- the sample consists of 100 acquiring listed companies between the periods of 1989 to 2011. Average 
abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal return of American bidding firm from 1998-2011, using the 
return Rit = (Pit ÐPit-1)/Pt-1. The t-statistics for AR and CAR shown in are statically significance. The study is 
using more than 10 years of merger and acquisition data, which possibly reduces mis-spesified biasness in the 
study. 
 
During the post-announcement period in the 28 days event window, day 6, 15 and 17 
all posses significant abnormal return with 10% significant (-0.573%, 0.345%, -
4.22%). For the pre announcement period there is no day with significant abnormal 
return. The table also reveal an -0.049% insignificant negative CAR around the 28 
Table 2
%
Days AR t-statistic Sign.level
-7 0.173 0.86
-6 -0.122 -0.8
-5 -0.015 -0.09
-4 -0.055 -0.27
-3 0.197 0.75
-2 0.019 0.12
-1 -0.103 -0.56
0 -1.273 -3.6 1%
1 0.179 0.54
2 -0.132 -0.55
3 0.002 0.01
4 -0.231 -1.44
5 0.176 0.83
6 -0.573 -1.96 10%
7 0.159 0.73
8 0.463 1.54
9 -0.195 -0.92
10 -0.278 -1.59
11 -0.071 -0.31
12 0.178 0.81
13 0.032 0.15
14 -0.003 -0.01
15 0.345 1.93 10%
16 0.295 1.38
17 -0.422 -1.72 10%
18 0.209 0.96
19 0.327 1.44
20 -0.253 -1.03
Mean Cumulative abnormal return 
%
Days N CARs t-statistic
(-7,+20) 101 -0.049 -0.25
(-2,+2) 101 -0.115 -1.56***
Announcement of the deal with 
28 days event period 
Announcement of the deal
  48 
days event date which is consistent with earlier studies such as Asquith et al (1983) 
with his CAR of -0,85% over a two days event period for US takeover bids over the 
period 1973-1983 and the Canadian study by Dutta and Jog (2009). However, this 
result does differ from other studies in other countries such as in Japan and UK where 
resent studies show a significant/insignificant positive abnormal return. According to 
Dutta and Jog (2009), the difference in results could possibly be due to different 
country features such as takeover regulations and other larger features related to size 
of target firms, the frequently use of cash or stock when financing deals, which 
according to them can possibly lead to positive or negative ARs and CARs for 
shareholders of acquired firms.  
 
As can be seen in the table, the abnormal return around the event date fluctuates from 
0.002% on the third day to a negative significance of -0.573% on day +6. When it 
comes to the CAR, both the 28days and 5days event period have negative CARs of -
0.049% and -0.115% with 5days event period having a higher negative significant 
return. By linking this result to the different M&A theories, the positive gain from the 
acquisition as one can see from day 1 in table 2 could possibly come from increase in 
synergistic gain. The positive value, or synergistic gain can also be seen as being 
derived especially from an increase in operational efficiency.  
These results indicate that the shareholders of acquiring firms gain not from the merge 
public announcement. Therefore, it can be concluded that the motivation behind 
mergers and acquisition such as expected synergy value is not always achievable. 
However, the negative insignificant abnormal result of acquiring returns implies that 
motivation undertaking mergers and acquisition are highly because of hubris and 
agency motivations (Fuller et al, 2002). Furthermore, Morck et al. (1990) supported 
the argument and stated that there is the possibility that hubris and agency motives are 
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the reason why there might be a decrease of abnormal return of the acquiring firms. 
The performance of stocks after deals cannot be investigated without studying the 
behaviour after deal completion. Table 3 plotted above shows a positive significant 
AR of 0,503% on the event date, which positively dropped at to day +1 (with a t-
statistic of 1,49) but then as proposed, reduces immediately after day +1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The significant levels of over performance suggest that the stockholder of acquiring 
firms get a wealth gain of about 0,503% at the announcement of the deal completion. 
The largest abnormal return is also on day 0, the date of announcement of the deal. 
Table 3
%
Days AR t-statistic Sign.level
-7 0.212 0.56
-6 0.211 1.00
-5 -0.005 -0.03
-4 -0.015 -0.09
-3 -0.097 -0.42
-2 -0.252 -0.97
-1 0.023 1.08
0 0.503 2.15 5%
1 0.350 1.49
2 -0.006 -0.03
3 -0.026 -0.14
4 -0.391 -1.74 10%
5 -0.040 -1.66 10%
6 -0.343 -1.47
7 -0.148 -0.51
8 -0.074 -0.37
9 -0.116 -0.51
10 -0.132 -0.46
11 -0.130 -0.52
12 0.078 0.36
13 0.076 0.34
14 -0.235 0.36
15 -0.014 -0.06
16 0.067 0.36
17 -0.057 -0.43
18 0.024 0.08
19 0.019 0.09
20 0.369 1.36
Mean Cumulative abnormal return 
%
Days N CARs t-statistic
(-7,+20) 101 -0.440 -0.26
(-2,+2) 101 0.370 0.28
Completion of the deal with 28 
days event period 
Completion of the deal
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During the post-announcement period, day 4 (-0.391%) and day 5(-0.040%) are 
significant.  
The CAR on the other hand has a negative insignificant return of -0.440%, which is 
less than that of 5days period CAR of 0,370% as (with a t-statistic of 0,28) stating that 
a decrease in event period creates a higher CAR. With an negative significant of 
0.006% on day 2 and continued negative returns over the 13 days after the deal made 
shows that after the completion of the M&A activity the abnormal return reduces 
which led one to believe that the stock performance of acquiring companies in short-
term does not create value.  
     
The differences in abnormal return when the event window decreases to 5 days prior 
to the merger announcement period is another factor that we will look into. Table 4 
shows that the abnormal return is essentially positively higher. In other words, the 
abnormal return is significant negative of -1.280 (t=-3.56) on day 0 which then 
increases as the days goes to a return of 0.220 significance in day +2 day (with a t-
statistic of 0.64). While on the completed day the AR show positive returns over the 4 
days around the event day with a significant positive return of 0. 514 from day 0 (with 
a t-statistic of 2.2) to an insignificant return of 0.030 (with a t-statistic of 0.09) on the 
last day. 
   
 
 
Table 4
% %
Days AR t-statistic Sign.level AR t-statistic Sign.level
-2 0.027 0.46 0.278 -1.06
-1 -0.017 -0.08 0.246 1.09 1%
0 -1.280 -3.56 1% 0.514 2.2 5%
1 0.220 0.64 5% 0.323 1.35
2 0.016 0.67 0.030 0.09
Announcement of the deal with 5 Completion of the deal with 5 
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If one uses Table 4 AR results to access shareholders return around the event period 
one can see that, investors who would buy shares in the firms 1 day before to the 
public announcement and sell them on announcement day would loss an significant 
abnormal return of -1.280% with t-statistic of -3.56. However if they sold their shares 
1 day after, the significant abnormal return would be 0.220%. On the other hand, if 
investors would buy shares 1 day before to the public announcement of the 
completion of the deal and sell them on the day of completion, they would have 
earned significant abnormal return of 0.514% with a t-statistic of 2.20. However, it is 
always open for discussion whether the trade is based on speculation or inside 
information. 
 
Figure 2, shows the overall AR over the announcements. From day -7 to  +20   the 
AR have an up and down trend around the announcement and completed day. 
Information leakage may be why one can see a greater upward movement of AR 
before the announcement. At the announcement, the market starts to respond to the 
news as the theory of market efficiency expresses. One of the observations is that 
most of the ARs lie below zero around the announcement but lies above zero around 
the completed day. The conclusion is that merger and acquisition firmsÕ lead to a 
negative effect on shareholdersÕ wealth of acquirer but a more positive effect on 
completion of the deal. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
4.2 Result of Firm size and Deal characteristics 
 
In this section, we first examine whether the cumulated announcement return 
behavior can be explain by the size effect. Last we examine whether the bidders 
method of payment influence the abnormal returns after acquisitions by estimate 
regression separately for small and large firms. 
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4.2.1 Cumulative return; Firm and Deal characteristics 
 
 
 
 
Announcement of CAR sorted by acquirer size. The sample consists of 100 acquiring listed companies between 
the periods of 1989 to 2011 with transaction value is at least 1 million. Small (large) firms are defined as being 
equal or smaller (larger) then the 25th percentile of NYSE firms at that year. Relative size is defined as the value of 
transaction divided by the market value of equity.  
Table 5 shows that shareholders from small firms generate a significant positive 
return of 2.690% while shareholders from larger firms have a return of 0.89%. The 
reason for this could be due to the fact that smaller firms possibly having it simpler to 
use the new capital provided for them after the acquisition. Also due to small firms 
being smaller than large firms, any announcement or significant performance will 
show more on them than for larger firms, which need to have a much bigger 
achievement to shock their stock performance.  In other words, the firmsÕ reason for 
M&A activity could be less of benefiting the managers themselves and more of 
maximize the firmsÕ performances and shareholdersÕ value (Less hubris, more 
managerial control).   
By looking at deal characteristics, the findings in Table 6 show that cash payment 
bids have a significant cumulated abnormal return higher than the stock (2.392% and 
1.251%), which follow the signaling hypothesis. The signaling hypothesis states that 
cash payment deals are seen as a good deal due to it not reveling of the biddersÕ true 
value therefore the cumulated abnormal return for cash offered bidding firms 
shareholders will be higher than for stock offered bidding firms.  
Table 5
% Large Small Difference 
(1) (2) (1)-(2)
CAR 0.89 2.69* -0.91*
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One can argue whether the payments with stock in deals could be one of many 
reasons of unsuccessful mergers and acquisitions. While both of the two payment 
methods still give positive abnormal return, paying deals with a mixture of the two 
payment methods could lead to a negative biddersÕ shareholders return of -2.23%. 
This suggests that an acquirer should choose a payment method that is beneficial to 
shareholders and not only managers. Since the relative size variable is positive 
insignificant, it demonstrations that there is a positive relationship between the 
bidderÕs return and bidder size.  
By linking the method of finance to size effect on table 7 one could notice that 
bidders paying deals with cash do acquire higher cumulated abnormal return, however 
when testing the returns using size effect the analysis will differ. The study found that 
large and small firms had and cumulated return of 0.254% and 0.543% (significant) 
for acquisitions paid with cash and 0.544% and 2.537% for payments equity. So in 
contract, the result of cumulative abnormal return for bidders shareholders firms does 
reduce when it is financed with equity which makes the study consistent with the 
monitoring and agency problem theory, which suggests that the incentives to monitor 
increase with the large shareholderÕs stake.  
 
Table 6
CAR % T- statistics
Cash 2.392** 1.37
Stock 1.251 0.60
Mix -2.233*** -2.40
Relative size 0.202 0.85
Panal A: Deal characteristics 
  55 
 
 
 
 
If large acquirers are affected by hubris, there will be a negative correlation between 
size and abnormal return, suggesting that hubris might be relevant for large size firms 
because their managers are more overconfident which overpay (Asquith,1983).  
Meanwhile acquisitions paid with mix payment method (stock+cash) have a negative 
relationship with CAR of being -0.150%(significant) for large firms but a more 
positive difference of 1.648% for small firms. In other words, small firms have 
possible abnormal return more for each type of financial methods while large firms 
have a negative abnormal return when paying with a mix method.  
 
4.3 Operating Performance of M&A active acquiring firms  
 
The figures of the study represent in table 8 represent the operating performance of 
M&A firms in a quarterly base.  The table shows the difference pair test used when 
testing the six financial ratios. Most of the ratios do improve after merger but 
statistically significant which tells us that mergers and acquisition deals do improve 
companiesÕ performance. In case of the leverage ratios, such as debt ratio, it reduced 
significantly in the post merger quarter period from being 0.0189 to -0.0109. The 
leverage ratio shows that the deals actually helps the performances of the firms, to 
rely less on debt financing after mergers than before which might be the reason for the 
increase profitability. Long-term profitability of firm is closely associated with the 
Table 7 Large Small Difference 
% (-1) (-2) (1)-(2)
Cash 0.254 0.543** -0.289*
Stock 0.544 2.537 -1.993
mix -0.150* 1.498 -1.648*
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growth in productive opportunity of the firm. As the current assets show a significant 
of 0.0047 and total asset increased from -0.0256 to 0.0085 with statically 
insignificant.  
   Table 8 
     
 
 
Note: P>t if the p-value is less than 0,05, 0.001, 0.01 then null hypothesis is equals zero is not rejected 
In this case, the many reasons to merge and acquire such as lower debts and higher 
gross profit are showing in this study, which tells us that many companies might 
achieve efficiency as they wished. If one looks at the profitability ratios such as ROA 
and gross profit, one can see that the profitability has increased during the post merger 
period, but with an insignificant value. Nevertheless, one ratio does not show an 
improvement in performances is EBITDA with a significant positive pre-merged ratio 
of 1.9613 but creates a significant negative post-merged ratio of -1.7240.  
Financial Ratios 
Mean t value Sign.Level
Pre M&A Current ratio -0.1295 -2.1869 5%
Pre M&A Total assets 
turnover 
-0.0256 -5.5201 1%
Pre M&A EBITDA 1.9613 2.4889 1%
Pre Gross profit margin 
-0.0144 -3.3557 1%
Pre ROA -0.0028 -4.3964 1%
Pre Debt ratio 0.0189 1.3340
Post M&A Current ratio 
-0.0368 -0.7540
Post M&A Total assets 
turnover 
0.0085 1.5797
Post M&A EBITDA -1.7240 -2.1067 5%
Post Gross profit margin 0.0047 0.7271
Post ROA 0.0006 0.3799
Post Debt ratio -0.0109 -1.8186
Paired difference test for 50 of the M&A 
firms 
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The financial indicators reveal that mergers and acquisition in different industries 
between 1998 and 2011 did achieve significant improvement during their post-
mergers period, which shows that the theories of positive performance after deals 
sometimes do transpire. One of the reasons for mergers and acquisition was just to 
create profitability, which in this by looking at the established table above been 
achieved.  
As discussed above, agency theory is one of the major reasons why deals often do not 
succeed. According to Ang et al (2000), agency costs can be measured by looking at 
asset turnover ratios. By using this thought, the small positive change in post-M&A 
assets turnover ratios in the table suggest a higher agency cost result from conflicts 
between managers and shareholders, which therefore would lead to a lower acquirer 
return as Humphery-Jenner & Powell (2011) suggested. 
 
5. Summary 
 
This study investigated the impact of mergers and acquisition activities on a short run 
stock return performance in different industries. The paper analysed the performance 
of American acquiring firms during the announcement and complete activity in using 
the AR and CAR measurement created by the market model. The study led to a 
negative performance around announcement of the deal with a more fluctuation AR 
after the announcement, while a positive abnormal return around complete date but 
constant negative returns after the announcement. 
 
The result of the previous studies do differ in some ways, first the abnormal return for 
bidders are not positive on the announcement for bidding firms in this study than in 
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previous studies. However, these figures are close to that of Asquith et al (1983) 
study, which analyse the mergers and acquisition between U.S. firms and report a 
negative abnormal return around event period. On average, mergers are seen as being 
somewhat not profitable in the sense that gains are not capitalized and that 
shareholders do not receive maximized return and create value. However, the lacks of 
insignificant of result makes one believe that the larger proportion of the gain goes to 
the target rather than the bidder firm (Gagnon et al, 1982). Consequently, the 
empirical evidence produced in this paper suggests that in American M&A active 
companiesÕ stocks between 1998 and 2011 do not reacts to merger announcements 
like it does in the other studies, and not even when the event window is lower such as 
5 days.  
When it comes to the operating performance, the indicators revealed that 100 acquirer 
companies in U.S. between 1989 and 2011 do sometimes achieve significant 
improvement after the first quarterly period. It gives the impression that the profit is 
might be generated each time. The combined means of the quarterly post merge 
results reveals that some companies perform insignificantly better while others show 
significantly decrease. The post merge profitability variables (ROA, gross profit) 
showed both insignificant positive performances during the post merger period.  
 
Lastly, I investigated cumulated returns following acquisitions by small and large 
firms. The study showed that small firmsÕ shares do fairly perform better than large 
firms. Overall the cumulated abnormal return exceeded the performance of large 
firms.  When it comes to the methods of payments, it seems that cash deals receive 
higher cumulated returns than stock perhaps because of signaling. Significant 
different result came from the variables of mix methods, which gives us a negative 
cumulative abnormal return.  
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The regression analysis indicates that the relationship between the bidder firmÕs 
cumulated abnormal return and relative firm size is positive with some statistically 
significant. These results do give us any striking answer evidence that cumulative 
cumulated abnormal return is related to the size effect and deal characteristics.  
 
Finally, to summarize the answers to the research questions above, one can positively 
say that the performances of acquirers are steady. The performances flutes more in 
terms of stock prices performance but gives us a more steadily performance with long 
term accounting performances.  
 
6. Implication, limitations and further recommendation.  
 
Even though the study provided some significant result, there are some further 
recommendations that might create a more reliable and valuable study. For example, 
it must be mentioned that this study specifically focused on acquiring companies and 
did not consider the abnormal return performance of the target companies. According 
to Loughran & Vijh (1997), target companies do create more value than acquiring 
companies. They discuss the possibility of target companiesÕ shareholder earning 
higher return than acquiring shareholders. This is an explanation of synergy and the 
overexcitement of the activity. Consequently, by including target companies in the 
study, one can investigate whether there is a shared efficiency between target and 
acquisitions. Also, due to the smaller sample size, the study might not be able to 
control significant results for different type of merger and acquisitions, which 
likewise could have an effect on the result on the study. 
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Based on studies such as Shleifer and Vishny (2001) to acquire a non-public firm 
creates more value than a public firm. Others also argue that there should not be any 
difference whether acquiring a public or private target. However, it could be that the 
gain in efficiency comes from the better price in the non-public target due to the 
difference in the market itself. Having said that, this study does not examine how long 
target firms have been public, and so cannot investigate whether it makes a difference 
in the acquiring returns if target firms been recently public or not. Field and 
Mulherin«s (1999) examination of recent and non-established public target firms 
showed that both acquirer and target firms have similar returns when acquirers do 
deals with them.  
 
It must also be considered that this study is a short-run performance measurement, 
which cannot be a good estimator of a long-term view. In other words, this study only 
shows the stock and operating performance in a short period, which of course do not 
necessarily holds in a longer period. That is why a long-term measurement of stock 
and operating performance would probably give a broader view of how acquiring 
companies performs in longer period such as months or even years. However, as 
Barber & Lyon (1997) and Kothari & Warner (1997; 2004) point out, there are major 
problems related to the long-term studies, which must carefully be taken into 
consideration in order to generate an unbiased study with no errors. 
 
 
 
  61 
REFERENCES  
 
Achampong, K. F. and Zemedkun, W. (1995). ÒAn Empirical and Ethical Analysis of 
Factors Motivating ManagersÕ Merger DecisionsÓ, Journal of Business Ethics, 14 (10) 
Agrawal, A, Jeffrey J.F and Mandelker G.N (1992), ÒThe Post-Merger Performance 
of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly,Ó Journal of Finance, 47: 
1605-1621. 
Alexandridis, G., Antoniou, A. and Zhao, H. (2006). ÒValuation effect of institutional 
ownership: the case of corporate takeoversÓ. European Financial Management, 
forthcoming. 
Anand, M. and Singh, J. (2008). ÒImpact of Merger Announcements on Shareholders 
Wealth: Evidence from Indian Private Sector BanksÓ Journal for Decision Makers, 
33(1), 35-54. 
Anderson, C and Mandelker G (1993). ÒLong Run Return Anomalies and the Book-
to-Market Effect: Evidence on Mergers and IPOs,Ó unpublished paper, Joseph M. 
Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh. 
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M. and Stafford, E. (2001). ÒNew Evidence and Perspectives 
on MergersÓ, Journal of Economic Perspective, 15(2)  
Andrew, W. (1988). ÒThe effect of diversification by acquisition on hospitality firm 
value: An empirical analysisÓ. Proceedings of the First Annual Research Symposium 
of the Association of Hospitality Financial Management Educators, 1, pp. 15-26. 
Ang, J. S., R.A. Cole and Wuh. J. L. (2000). ÒAgency costs and ownership structureÓ, 
Journal of Finance 55, p. 81-106. 
Armitage, S. (1995). ÒEvent Study Methods and Evidence on Their PerformanceÓ, 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 8(4) p. 25-52. 
 
Asquith, P. (1983). ÒMerger bids, uncertainty and stockholder returnsÓ. Journal of 
Financial Economics 11, pp. 51Ð83. 
Asquith, P., Bruner, R., Mullins, D.(1983b). ÒThe gains to bidding firms from 
  62 
mergerÓ. Journal of Financial Economics 11, 121Ð139. 
Azhagaiah, R. and Kumar, T. S. (2011). ÒMergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical 
Study on the Short-Term Post-Merger Performance of Corporate Firms in India,Ó 
International Journal of Research in Commerce, Economics and Management, 1(3), 
pp. 80-103. 
Ball, R. and Brown, P. (1968). ÒAn empirical evaluation of accounting income 
numbersÓ. Journal of Accounting Research 6, 159-178. 
Barber, B. M. and Lyon, J. D. (1997). ÒDetecting long run abnormal stock returns: the 
empirical power and specification of test statisticsÓ. Journal of Financial Economics, 
43, 341Ð372. 
Becker, J. R., Goldberg, L. G. and Kaen, F. R. (2008). ÒMergers and Acquisitions as a 
Response to the Deregulation of the Electric Power Industry: Value Creation or Value 
Destruction?Ó Journal of Regulatory Economics 33(1)  
Beena, P. L. (2000). ÒAn Analysis of Mergers in the Private Corporate Sector in 
IndiaÓ, Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Working Paper No 
301.  
Blume, M. E. and Stambaugh, R. F. (1983). ÒBiases in Computed Returns: An 
Application to the Size EffectÓ Journal of Financial Economics 12: pp. 387-404  
Boone, A  and Mulherin, J (2000). ÒComparing acquisitions and divestituresÓ. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 6, pp.117-139.  
Boone, A. L. and Mulherin, J. H. (2008). ÒDo Auctions induce a WinnerÕs Curse? 
New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover MarketÓ, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 89, pp. 1-19  
Bradley, M., Desai, A. and Kim, E. H. (1988). ÒSynergistic gains from corporate 
acquisitions and their divisions between stockholders of target and acquiring firmsÓ. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 21, pp. 3Ð40. 
Brealey, R.A. and Myers, S.C. (2004). Principles of corporate finance, Seventh ed., 
McGraw-Hill: New York. 
  63 
Brown, S. J. and Warner, J. B. (1985). ÒUsing daily stock returns: The case of event 
studiesÓ, Journal of Financial Economics 14, pp. 3-31. 
Brown, S., et J. Warner (1980). ÒMeasuring security price performance,Ó Journal of 
Financial Economics, 8, pp. 205-258. 
Cabanda, E. and Pajara-Pascual, M. (2007). ÒMerger in the Philippines: Evidence in 
the Corporate Performance of William, Gothong, and Aboitiz (WG&A) Shipping 
CompaniesÓ, Journal of Business Case Studies 3(4), pp. 87-100.  
Campbell, R. D., Gosh, C. and Sirmans, C. F. (2001). ÒThe Information Content of 
Method of Payment: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)Ó. Real 
Estate Economics, 29, 360-387 
Canagavally, R. (2000). ÒAn Evaluation of Mergers and AcquisitionsÓ, 
Dissertation (Unpublished), Pondicherry University, Pondicherry.  
Chan, S. H., Kensinger, J. W., Keown, A. J., & Martin, J. D. (1997). ÒDo strategic 
alliances create value?Ó Journal of Financial Economics, 46(2), pp. 199-221. 
Cornett, M. M. and Tehranian, H. (1992). ÒChanges in corporate performance 
associated with bank acquisitionsÓ. Journal of Financial Economics, 31, 211-234 
Cornett, M. M., McNutt, J. J. and Tehranian, H. (2006). ÒPerformance changes 
around bank mergers: Revenue enhancements versus cost reductionsÓ. Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking 38, pp. 1013-1050. 
Demirbag, M., Ng, C. K, and Tatoglu, E. (2007). ÒPerformance of Mergers and 
Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Comparative Perspective,Ó The 
Multinational Business Review, 15(2), pp. 4 1-61. 
DeYoung, R., Douglas, E. and Molyneux, P. (2009). Mergers and Acquisitions of 
Financial Institutions: A Review of the Literature. Journal of Financial Services 
Research, 36, pp. 87-110. 
Dickerson, A. P., Gibson, H. D. and Euclid, (1997). ÒThe Impact of Acquisitions on 
Company Performance: Evidence from a Large Panel of UK FirmsÓ, Oxford 
Economic Papers, New Series, 49(3), July, pp. 344-361  
  64 
Dimson, E. and Marsh, P. (1986). ÒEvent Study Methodology and the Size Effect: 
The Case of UK Press RecommendationsÓ, Journal of Financial Economics, 17, pp. 
113-142. 
Ding. R, Mohammad, M. (2010). ÒBooms, Busts, and Firm Exit: Evidence from 
M&A Activities Across Business CyclesÓ. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1630909 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1630909 
 
Dutta, S and Jog, V (2009). ÒThe Long-Term Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re- 
Examination of an AnomalyÓ, Journal of Banking & Finance 33 pp.1400-141  
Eckbo, B. E., (1983). ÒHorizontal Mergers, Collusion, and Stockholder WealthÓ, 
Journal of Financial Economics 11, pp. 241-273  
Ederington, L. H. and Guan, W. (2005). ÒForecasting volatilityÓ. Journal of Futures 
Markets, 25(5), pp. 465-490.  
Elton, E. J, Gruber, M. J, Brown, S. J and Goetzmann, W. N. (2003), ÔModern 
Protfolio Theory and Investment AnalysisÕ, 6th edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
Hoboken, quoated in Eriksen, R. and M¿ller, L. M  (2008). ÒAn empirical study of the 
value creation in Mergers and AcquisitionsÐ in relation to the strategic rationale; 
Focusing on acquiring companies located in the UK or ScandinaviaÓ, thesis 
(Unpublished), University of Aarhus.  
Eriksen, R. and M¿ller, L. M  (2008). ÒAn empirical study of the value creation in 
Mergers and AcquisitionsÐ in relation to the strategic rationale; Focusing on acquiring 
companies located in the UK or ScandinaviaÓ, thesis (Unpublished), University of 
Aarhus. Accessed at http://pure.au.dk/portal-asb-
student/files/3251/Value_creation_in_M_A.pdf on 23rd July 2012 
Fama, E. F. (1970). ÒEfficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical 
workÓ, Journal of Finance, 25 (2). 
Fama, E., Fisher, L., Jensen, M. and Roll, R. (1969). ÒThe Adjustment of Stock Prices 
to New InformationÓ, International Economic Review, 10(1) pp. 1-21  
Fama, E., French, F. and Kenneth, R. (1993). ÒCommon Risk Factors in the Returns 
  65 
on Stocks and BondsÓ. Journal of Financial Economics 33 (1): pp. 3Ð56.  
Franks, J. and Harris, R. S. (1989). Shareholder wealth effects of corporate takeovers: 
the U.K. experience 
Franks, J., Harris, R. and Titman, S. (1991). ÒThe postmerger share-price performance 
of acquiring firmsÓ, Journal of Financial Economics. 29(1), pp. 81-96. 
Fuller, K. P., Netter, J. M. and Stegemoller, M. (2002).  ÒWhat Do Returns to 
Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence from Firms that Make Many AcquisitionsÓ 
Journal of Finance 57(4) 
Gagnon, J., Brehain, P., Broquet C. and Guerra, F. (1982). ÒStock market behaviour 
of merging firms: The Belgian experienceÓ, European Economic Review, 17 (2), pp. 
187-211 
Gallet, C. A. (1996). ÒMergers and Market Power in the U.S. Steel IndustryÓ, Applied 
Economics Letters 3, pp. 221-223.  
Gaughan, P. A. (2002). Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings. 3 ed. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Ghosh, A (2001). ÒDoes operating performance really improve following corporate 
acquisitions?Ó Journal of Corporate Finance, 7, pp 151-178.  
Gregory, A. (1997). ÒAn examination of the long run performance of UK acquiring 
firmsÓ. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 24, pp. 971Ð1007. 
Gregory, A. and McCorriston, S. (2005). ÒForeign acquisitions by UK limited 
companies: short- and long-run performance.Ó Journal of Empirical Finance, 12, pp. 
99Ð125. 
Hannan, T. H. and Pilloff, S. J. (2006). ÒAcquisition targets and motives in the 
banking industryÓ. Federal Reserve Board Finance and Economics Discussion Series 
2006.  
Hariharan, P. S. (2005). ÒPitfalls in Mergers Acquisitions and Takeovers (A-Z of 
Merger FailuresÓ, The Management Accountant, 40 (10) 
  66 
Healy P. M., Palepu, K. G. and Ruback, R. S. (1992): ÒDoes Corporate Performance 
Improve After Mergers?Ó, Journal of Financial Economics, 31, pp. 135- 175 . 
Heron, R. and Lie, E. (2002). ÒOperating performance and the method of payment in 
takeoversÓ. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 37, pp. 137-156. 
Humphery-Jenner, M. and Powell, R. G. (2011). ÒFirm size, takeover profitability, 
and the effectiveness of the market for corporate control: Does the absence of anti-
takeover provisions make a difference?Ó The Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(3) pp. 
418-437 
Hviid, M. and Prendergast, C. (1993). ÒMerger Failure and Merger ProfitabilityÓ, 
Journal of Industrial Economics 41(4), pp. 371-386.  
Ikeda, K. and Doi, N. (1983). ÒThe Performances of Merging Firms in Japanese 
Manufacturing Industry: 1964-75Ó, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 31(3), pp 
257-266.  
Jayakumar, S. (1999). ÒMergers and Acquisitions: An Evaluation StudyÓ, M. Phil 
Dissertation (Unpublished), Pondicherry University, Pondicherry  
Jensen, M. and Ruback, R. (1983): ÒThe Market for Corporate Control Ð The 
Scientific EvidenceÓ, Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1-4), pp. 5-50. 
Jensen, M. C. (1993). ÒThe Modern Indus- trial Revolution, Exit, and Control 
Systems.Ó Journal of Finance. 48, pp. 831-80. 
Kangari, R. (1988). ÒBusiness Failure in Construction IndustryÓ. Journal of 
Construction  Engineering and Management  114 (2),  pp. 172-190. 
 
King, D., Dalton, D., Daily, C., and Covin, J. (2004). ÒMeta-Analysis of Post-
Acquisition Performance: Identifications of Unidentified ModeratorsÓ, Strategic 
Management Journal, February, pp. 187-201.  
 
Kitching, J. (1967). ÒWhy do mergers miscarryÓ, Harvard Business Review, Vol 45, 
pp. 84-101. 
 
 
  67 
Knapp, M., Gart, A. and Chaudhry, M. (2006). ÒThe impact of mean reversion of 
bank profitability on post- merger performance in the banking industryÓ. Journal of 
banking and finance, 30, pp. 3503-3517. 
 
Kothari, S. P. and Warner, J. B. (1997). Measuring long-horizon security price 
performance. Journal of Financial Economics 43, pp. 301-340. 
 
Kothari, S. P. and Warner, J. B. (2004). ÒEconometrics of Event StudiesÓ. In Eckbo. 
B.E. (ed.), Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier/North-Holland. 
 
Krant, M. (2012). ÒAsk Matt: M&A activity continues to be weakÓ Accessed at  
http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/columnist/krantz/story/2012-06-14/mergers-
acquisitions/55604836/1 on 23 July 2012. 
 
Kruse, T. A., Park, H. Y., Park, K. and Suzuki, K. (2007). ÒLong-term Performance 
following Mergers of Japanese Companies: The Effect of Diversification and 
Affiliation,Ó Pacific- Basin Finance Journal, 15, pp. 154-172. 
 
Kukalis, S. (2007). ÒCorporate Strategy and Company Performance: The Case of Post 
Merger PerformanceÓ, The International Journal of Finance, 19 (3) pp. 4475-4489.  
 
Kumar, B. R., and Rajib, P. (2007). ÒMergers and Corporate Performance in India: 
An Empirical Study,Ó Decision, 34(1), pp. 121-147. 
Kumar, M. S. (1984). Growth, Acquisition and Investment: An analysis of the growth 
of industrial firms and their overseas activities. Cambridge University Press. 
Kumar, R. (2009). ÒPost-Merger Corporate Performance: An Indian PerspectiveÓ, 
Management Research News, 32 (2), pp. 145-157. 
Kwan, S. and Wilcox, J. (2002). Hidden cost reduction in bank mergers: Accounting 
for more productive banks. Research in Finance, 19, pp. 109-124. 
Kwansa, F. A. (1994). ÒAcquisitions, shareholder wealth and the lodging sector: 
1980-1990Ó. International Journal of contemporary Hospitality Management, 6(6), 
  68 
pp. 16-20.  
Laabs, J. P. and Schiereck, D. (2010). ÒThe Long-Term Success of M&A in the 
Automotive Supply Industry: Determinants of Capital Market Performance,Ó Journal 
of Economic Finance, 34, pp. 61Ð88. 
Langetieg, T. C. (1978). ÒAn Application of a Three-Factor Performance Index to 
Measure Stockholder Gains from Merger,Ó Journal of Financial Economics, 6: pp. 
365-383. 
Lau, H. (2007). ÒExamine the Effect of Tender Offers and Mergers Announcement on 
ShareholdersÕ Wealth of Targets and Acquirers in Hong KongÓ, Dissertation 
(Unpublished), University of Nottingham. Assessed at 
http://edissertations.nottingham.ac.uk/1579/1/MERGERS_AND_ACQUISITIONS_I
N_TEA_INDUSTRY.pdf on 31 June. 
 
Limmack, R. J. (1991). ÒCorporate mergers and wealth effects: 1977Ð86Ó. Accounting 
and Business Research, 21, pp. 239Ð251. 
Linn, S.C. and McConnell, J. J. (1983). ÒAn empirical investigation of the impact of 
anti-takeover amendments on common stock pricesÓ. Journal of Financial 
Economics, pp. 361-400.  
Loughran, T. and Vijh, A. M. (1997). ÒDo long term shareholders benefit from 
corporate acquisitions?Ó Journal of Finance, 52, pp. 1759Ð1790. 
Magenheim, E. B. and Mueller, D. C. (1988). ÒAre Acquiring-Firm Shareholders 
Better off after an Acquisition?Ó in John C. Coffee, Jr., Louis Lowenstein, and Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, editors, Knights, Raiders and Targets: The Impact of the Hostile 
Takeover, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Malatesta, P. H. (1983). ÒThe Wealth Effect of Merger Activity and the Objective 
Functions of Merging Firms,Ó Journal of Financial Economics, 11: pp. 155-181. 
Mallikarjunappa, T. and Nayak, P. (2007). ÒWhy Do Mergers and Acquisitions Quite 
Often Fail?Ó, AIMS International Journal of Management, 1 (1) 
Mantravadi, P. and Reddy. A.V. (2008a). ÒPost-merger performance of acquiring 
  69 
firms from different industries in IndiaÓ. International Research Journal of Finance 
and Economics, 22, pp. 192 Ð 204. 
Mantravadi, P. and Reddy. A.V. (2008b).Ó Type of merger and impact on operating 
performance: the Indian experienceÓ. Economic and Political Weekly 43, pp. 66-74. 
Marimuthu, M. (2008). ÒMergers and acquisitions: some empirical evidence on 
performance, financial characteristics and firm sustainabilityÓ, International journal 
of business and management, 3 (10). 
McIntosh, W, Officer, D.T, Born, J.A (2001). ÒThe Wealth Effects of Merger 
Activities: Further Evidence from Real Estate Investment TrustsÓ. The Journal of 
Real Estate Research, 3, 141-155 
Mead, L. W. (1969). ÒInstantaneous Merger Profit Theory as a Conglomerate Merger 
MotiveÓ, Western Economic Journal, 7 (4) 
Meeks, G. (1977). Disappointing Marriage: Gains from Mergers. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Megginson, W., Morgan A. and Nail, L. (2004). ÒThe Determinate of Positive Long-
Term Performance in Strategic Merger: Corporate Focus and CashÓ, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, pp. 523-552.  
Mitchell, M. L. and Lehn, K. (1990). ÒDo bad bidders become good targets?Ó. 
Journal of Political Economy, 98, pp. 372Ð398. 
Mitchell, M. L. and Mulherin, J. H. (1996). ÒThe Impact of Industry Shocks on Take- 
over and Restructuring Activity.Ó Journal of Financial Economics. 41, pp. 193-229. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1990). Do managerial objectives drive bad 
acquisitions? Journal of Finance 45 (1), pp. 31-48.  
Mueller, D. C. (1980). The Determinants and Effects of Mergers, Cambridge Mass, 
quoted in Ransariya, S. N. (2010). ÒFinancial Growth Indicator of Merger and 
Acquisition in Indian Corporate SectorÓ, thesis PhD, Saurashtra University. 
Nelson, R. L. (1959). Merger Movements in American Industry (1895-1956). 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, quoted in Kummer, H. (2006) ÒMergers & 
  70 
acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry in South America: activity and strategic 
intentionsÓ Accessed at http://www.imaa-
institute.org/docs/kummer_mergers%20acquisitions%20m&a%20pharmaceutical%20
industry%20south%20america%20activity%20strategic%20intentions%20strategy.pd
f on 15 jul 2012. 
Ooghe, H., Laere, E. V. and Langhe, T. D. (2006). ÒAre Acquisitions Worthwhile? 
An Empirical Study of the Post Acquisition Performance of Privately held Belgian 
Companies, Small Business Economics, 27 (2-3), pp. 223-243  
Pawaskar, V. (2001). ÒEffect of Mergers on Corporate Performance in IndiaÓ, Vikalpa 
26 (1) 
Pazarskis, M., Vogiatzogloy, M., Christodoulou, P. and Drogalas, G. (2006). 
ÒExploring the Improvement of Corporate Performance after Mergers-The Case of 
GreeceÓ, International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 6, p.184  
Pilloff, S. J. (1996). ÒPerformance Changes and Shareholder Wealth Creation 
Associated with Mergers of Publicly Traded Banking InstitutionsÓ. Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, 28 (3), pp. 294-310 
PWC, Ó (2012).  US Financial Services M&A activity likely to increase in 2012 as 
markets improve, sales by European banks accelerate, says PwC USÓ Accessed at 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/press-releases/2012/us-financial-services-m-and-a-
activity.jhtml on 23 July 2012. 
 
Ramakrishna, K. (2008). ÒLong-term Post-merger Performance of Firms in India,Ó 
Vikalpa, 33(2), pp. 47-63. 
 
Ramaswamy, K. P., and Waegelein J. F. (2003). ÒFirm Financial Performance 
following MergersÓ, Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 20, pp.115Ð
126.  
 
Ransariya, S. N. (2010). ÒFinancial Growth Indicator of Merger and Acquisition in 
Indian Corporate SectorÓ, thesis PhD, Saurashtra University. 
 
  71 
Rau, P. R. and Vermaelen, T. (1998). ÒGlamour, value and the post-acquisition 
performance of acquiring firmsÓ, Journal Of Financial Economics, (49)2 pp. 223-
253. 
Ravenscraft, D. J. and F. M. Scherer (1989). ÒThe Profitability of Mergers.Ó Journal 
of Industrial Economics. 7, pp. 101-16. 
Ravenscraft, D. J. and Scherer, fm. (1987a). ÒLife after takeoverÓ. The Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 16(2), pp.147-156. 
 
Ravenscraft, D. J. and Scherer, fm. (1987b). ÒMergers, Sell-Offs, and Economic 
EfficiencyÓ. Brookings Institute, Washington.  
 
Roll, R. (1986). The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of Business, 
59, pp. 197Ð216. 
Ruhani, Ali. and Gupta, G. S. (1999). ÒMotivation and Outcome of Malaysian 
Takeovers: An International PerspectiveÓ, Vikalpa, 24, pp. 41- 49.  
Sankar, A. and Rao, K.V. (1998). ÒTakeovers as a Strategy of Turnaround- An 
Empirical StudyÓ, The Indian Journal of Commerce, Vol 51, pp. 47- 56.  
Seth, A. (1990). Value creation in acquisitions: A re-examination of performance 
issues. Strategic Management Journal, 11, pp. 99-115. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (2001). ÒStock Market Driven AcquisitionsÓ Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=278563 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.278563. 
Sirower, M. L. and O'Byrne S. F. (1998). ÒThe measurement of post-acquisition 
performance: toward a value-based benchmarking methodologyÓ, Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance. 11(2): pp. 107Ð121. 
Soongswang, A. (2009). ÒShareholder Wealth Effects: Successful vs. Unsuccessful 
BiddersÓ, Journal of Accounting Ð Business & Management, 16 (1), pp. 45-64  
Standard and PoorÕs (S&P), (2012). ÓCross-Market Commentary: Foreign 
Acquisitions Dominate U.S. M&A ActivityÓ Accessed at 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/products-
  72 
services/articles/en/ap/?articleType=HTML&assetID=1245339466808 on 23 July 
2012.  
Stigler, G, J. (1950). ÒMonopoly and Oligopoly by MergerÓ American Economic 
Review 40 (2), pp. 23-34.       
Sudarsanam, S. and Mahate, A. A. (2003). Glamour acquirers, method of payment 
and post-acquisition performance: the UK evidence. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, 30, pp. 299Ð341. 
Sudarsanamet, (1996).  ÒShareholder wealth gains in mergers: effect of synergy and 
ownership structureÓ Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 23, (5-6), pp. 673Ð
698. 
 
Surjit, K. (2002). ÒA study of corporate takeovers in IndiaÓ, submitted to University 
of Delhi, PhD thesis abstract, pp. 1-11. 
Tambi, M. K. (2005). ÒImpact of Mergers and Amalgamation on the Performance of 
Indian CompaniesÓ, [Online] available from 
http://129.3.20.41/eps/fin/papers/0506/0506007.pdf, accessed at 7th July, 2012.  
The economist (2008). ÒIdea: Economies of scale and scopeÓ. Assessed at 
http://www.economist.com/node/12446567 on 31 June 2012 
The Journal of Finance, 42(4), pp. 943-963 
 
Thomson Reuters (2010) http://thomsonreuters.com/ 
 
Trautwein, F. (1990). ÒMerger Motives and PrescriptionsÓ. Strategic Management 
Journal, 11 (4), pp. 283-295. 
Travlos, N. (2009). ÒCorporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding 
Firms' Stock Returns  
Tuch, C. and O'Sullivan, N. (2007). ÒThe impact of acquisitions on firm performance: 
A review of the evidenceÓ. International Journal of Management Reviews, 9(2), pp. 
  73 
141-170. 
Vanitha, H. and Selvam, M. (2007). ÒFinancial Performance of Indian Manufacturing 
Companies during Pre and Post Merger,Ó Journal of Finance and Economics, 12, pp. 
7-35. 
Weston, J. F., and Mansinghka, S. K. (1971). ÒTests of the Efficiency Performance of 
Conglomerate FirmsÓ, Journal of Finance, pp. 919-936.  
Yang. J. (2008). ÒMerger abnormal returns and payment methods of hospitality 
firmsÓ. Dissertation (Unpublished), Oklahoma State University Stillwater, Oklahoma. 
Accessed at 
http://139.78.48.197/utils/getfile/collection/theses/id/3205/filename/3206.pdf on Sept 
4 2012  
Yeh, T. and Hoshino, Y. (2002). ÒProductivity and Operating Performance of 
Japanese Merging Firms: Keiretsu-Related and Independent MergersÓ, Japan and the 
World Economy 14, pp. 347-366.  
Yook, K. C. (2004). ÒThe Measurement of Post-Acquisition Performance Using 
EVAÓ, Quarterly Journal of Business & Economics, pp. 67- 84.  
Yuce, A. and Ng, A. (2005). ÒEffects of Private and Public Canadian MergersÓ, 
Journal of Administrative Sciences, June, pp. 111-124.  
 
 
 
 
 
  74 
APPENDEX 
Merger and Acquisition deals between period 1989 -2008 
Bidder Firm Target Firm Year of Announcement  
ADOBE SYSTEMS INC MACROMEDIA INC 2005 
AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES INC VARIAN INC 2009 
ALBEMARLE CORP SORBER TECHNOLOGIES 2008 
ALLERGAN INC INAMED CORP 2005 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS INC MISSION REASERCH 
CORPORATION  
2004 
ALTRIA GROUP INC JOHN MIDDLETON INC 2007 
AMEREN CORP NRG ENERGY INC GAS 2005 
AMERICAN TOWER CORP SPECTRASITE INC 2005 
AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC BLOCK H & R INC 2008 
AMGEN INC ILYPSA INC 2007 
AMPHENOL CORP ULTRAMAR DIAMOND SHAMROCK 2005 
ASHLAND INC HERCULES INC 2008 
BANK OF AMERICA CORP FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORP 2003 
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP MELLON FINANCIAL CORP 2006 
BENCHMARK ELECTRONICS INC PEMSTAR INC 2006 
BLACK HILLS CORP AQUILA INC 2007 
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP GUIDANT CORP 2005 
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO MEDAREX INC 2009 
BROCADE COMMUNICATIONS SYS FOUNDRY NETWORKS INC 2008 
ARROW ELETRONICS INC  KEYLINK SYSTEMS GROUP  2007 
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CA INC NIMSOFT INC 2010 
CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP NORTH FORK BANCORPORATION 2006 
CELGENE CORP PHARMION CORP 2007 
CENTURYLINK INC EMBARQ CORP 2008 
CENVEO INC NASHUA CORP 2009 
CHARLES RIVER LABS INTL INC INVERESK RESEARCH GROUP INC 2004 
CHEVRON CORP UNOCAL CORP 2005 
CHIQUITA BRANDS INTL INC FRESH EXPRESS CO 2005 
CITIGROUP INC TXU CO 2007 
AVNET  MEMECGROUP HOLDING 2005 
BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC  ARCEMIX CORP 2010 
COMPUTER SCIENCE DATATRAC 2007 
CVS CAREMARK CORP LONGS DRUG STORES CORP 2008 
DELTA AIR LINES INC COMAIR HOLDINGS INC 1999 
DISNEY (WALT) CO PIXAR 2006 
DOW CHEMICAL ROHM AND HAAS CO 2008 
BB&T CORP  FIRST CITIZENS BANCORP 2006 
DUKE REALTY CORP WEEKS CORP 1999 
E M C CORP VMARE 2003 
EBAY INC PAYPAL INC 2002 
CITY NATIONAL CORPORATION BUSINESS BANK CORP 2006 
EQUITY ONE INC IRT PROPERTY CO 2002 
EXXON MOBIL CORP XTO ENERGY 2009 
FEDEX CORP PARCEL DIRECT 2004 
EATON  AT HOLDING CORP 2006 
FIRSTENERGY CORP GPU INC 2000 
FISERV INC CHECKFREE CORP 2007 
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GAMESTOP CORP IMPULSE INC 2010 
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP ANTEON INTERNATIONAL CORP 2005 
EASTMAN CHEMICAL CO GENOVIQUE SPECIALIIES CORP 2010 
HARSCO CORP EXCELL MATERIALS INC 2007 
GILEAD SCIENCES INC CV THERAPEUTICS INC 2009 
GOODRICH CORP RAYTHEON CO 2000 
GREAT PLAINS ENERGY INC AQUILA INC 2007 
HAIN CELESTIAL GROUP INC AVALON NATURAL PRODUCTS 2006 
HERCULES OFFSHORE INC TODCO 2007 
HEWLETT-PACKARD CO MERCURY GENERAL CORP 2006 
HOME DEPOT INC HUGHES SUPPLY INC 2006 
JARDEN CORP HOLMES GROUP INC 2005 
JDS UNIPHASE CORP PICOLIGNT INC 2007 
JOHNSON CONTROLS INC YORK INTERNATIONAL CORP 2005 
KELLOGG CO BEAR NAKED INC 2007 
KIMCO REALTY CORP MID-ATLANTIC REALTY TRUST 2003 
LEE ENTERPRISES INC PULITER INC 2005 
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS INC TELCOVE 2006 
LIBERTY PROPERTY TRUST REPUBLIC PROPERTY TRUST  2007 
LIGAND PHARMACEUTICAL INC METABASIS THERAPEUTICS INC 2009 
LILLY (ELI) & CO IMCLONE SYSTEMS INC 2008 
LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP JEFFESON-PILOT 2005 
MCCLATCHY CO -CL A KNIGHT-RIDDER INC 2006 
MEDTRONIC INC KYPHON INC 2007 
MOLEX INC WOODHEAD INDUSTRIES INC 2006 
MONSANTO CO DELTA & PINE LAND CO 2006 
NEWS CORP DOW JONES & CO INC 2007 
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NRG ENERGY INC GREEN MOUNTAIN ENERGY 2010 
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP VINTAGE PETROLEUM INC 2005 
HUMANA INC  CAREPLUS HEALTH PLANS  2004 
OLD REPUBLIC INTL CORP MGIC INVESTMENT CORP 2007 
OM GROUP INC ROCKWOOD HOLDINGS INC 2007 
ORACLE CORP SIEBEL SYSTEMS INC 2005 
OSHKOSH CORP JLG INDUSTRIES INC 2006 
PFIZER INC PHARMACIA CORP 2002 
PILGRIM'S PRIDE CORP GOLD KIST INC 2006 
INTEL CORP WIND RIVER SYSTEMS NC  2009 
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP AMSOUTH BANCROP 2006 
REPUBLIC SERVICE ALLIED WASTE INDUSTRIES INC 2008 
IBM CORP FILENET CORP 2006 
SEMPRA ENERGY ENERGYSOUTH INC 2008 
SPRINT NEXTEL CORP NEXTEL COMMUNICATIONS INC 2004 
STATE STREET CORP INVESTORS FINANCIAL  2007 
TELEFLEX INC ARROW INTERNATIONAL INC 2007 
TIBCO SOFTWARE INC TALARIAN CORP 2002 
TITAN CORP BTG INC 2001 
UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC PACIFICARE HEALTH SYSTEMS 2005 
URS  WACHINGTON GROUP INT 2007 
VALERO ENERGY CORP PREMCOR INC  2005 
WATSON PHARMACEUTICALS INC ANDRX CORP 2006 
WELLPOINT INC WELLCHOICE INC 2005 
WELLS FARGO & CO WACHOVIA CORP 2008 
WEYERHAEUSER CO WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES 2000 
XEROX CORP GLOBAL IMAGING SYSTEMS 2007 
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